Introduction to clarithmetic I  by Japaridze, Giorgi
Information and Computation 209 (2011) 1312–1354Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Information and Computation
www.elsevier.com/locate/yinco
Introduction to clarithmetic I
Giorgi Japaridze a,b,∗
a School of Computer Science and Technology, Shandong University, Middle Shunhua Road, Jinan, Shandong, PR China
b Department of Computing Sciences, Villanova University, 800 Lancaster Avenue, Villanova, PA 19085, USA
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
Article history:
Received 26 March 2010
Revised 1 June 2011
Available online 2 August 2011
Keywords:
Computability logic
Interactive computation
Implicit computational complexity
Game semantics
Peano arithmetic
Bounded arithmetic
“Clarithmetic” is a generic name for formal number theories similar to Peano arithmetic, but
based on computability logic instead of the more traditional classical or intuitionistic logics.
Formulas of clarithmetical theories represent interactive computational problems, and their
“truth” is understood as existence of an algorithmic solution. Imposing various complexity
constraints on such solutions yields various versions of clarithmetic. The present paper
introduces a system of clarithmetic for polynomial time computability, which is shown to
be sound and complete. Sound in the sense that every theorem T of the system represents
an interactive number-theoretic computational problem with a polynomial time solution
and, furthermore, such a solution can be eﬃciently extracted from a proof of T . And
complete in the sense that every interactive number-theoretic problem with a polynomial
time solution is represented by some theorem T of the system. The paper is written in a
semitutorial style and targets readers with no prior familiarity with computability logic.
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Computability logic (CoL), introduced in [13,17,26], is a semantical, mathematical and philosophical platform, and a long-
term program, for redeveloping logic as a formal theory of computability, as opposed to the formal theory of truth which
logic has more traditionally been. Under the approach of CoL, formulas represent computational problems, and their “truth”
is seen as algorithmic solvability. In turn, computational problems — understood in their most general, interactive sense —
are deﬁned as games played by a machine against its environment, with “algorithmic solvability” meaning existence of a
machine that wins the game against any possible behavior of the environment. And an open-ended collection of the most
basic and natural operations on computational problems forms the logical vocabulary of the theory. With this semantics,
CoL provides a systematic answer to the fundamental question “what can be computed?”, just as classical logic is a systematic
tool for telling what is true. Furthermore, as it turns out, in positive cases “what can be computed” always allows itself to
be replaced by “how can be computed”, which makes CoL of potential interest in not only theoretical computer science,
but many applied areas as well, including interactive knowledge base systems, resource oriented systems for planning and
action, or declarative programming languages.
While potential applications have been repeatedly pointed out in earlier papers on CoL, so far all technical efforts had
been mainly focused on ﬁnding axiomatizations for various fragments of this semantically conceived and inordinately ex-
pressive logic. Considerable advances have already been made in this direction [14–16,18–29,34], and more results in the
same style are probably still to come. It should be however remembered that the main value of CoL, or anything else
claiming to be a “Logic” with a capital “L”, will eventually be determined by whether and how it relates to the outside,
extra-logical world. In this respect, unlike many other systems oﬃcially classiﬁed as “logics”, the merits of classical logic
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arithmetic PA, can be and have been successfully based on it. Unlike pure logics with their meaningless symbols, such
theories are direct tools for studying and navigating the real world with its non-man-made, meaningful objects, such as
natural numbers in the case of arithmetic. To make this point more clear to a computer scientist, one could compare a pure
logic with a programming language, and applied theories based on it with application programs written in that language.
A programming language created for its own sake, mathematically or esthetically appealing but otherwise unusable as a
general-purpose, comprehensive basis for application programs, would hardly be of much interest.
So, in parallel with studying possible axiomatizations and various metaproperties of pure CoL, it would certainly be
worthwhile to devote some efforts to justifying its right on existence through revealing its power and appeal as a basis for
applied systems. First and so far the only concrete steps in this direction have been made very recently in [27], where a
CoL-based system CLA1 of (Peano) arithmetic was constructed.1 Unlike its classical-logic-based counterpart PA, CLA1 is not
merely about what arithmetical facts are true, but about what arithmetical problems can be actually computed or effectively
solved. More precisely, every formula of the language of CLA1 expresses a number-theoretic computational problem (rather
than just a true/false fact), every theorem expresses a problem that has an algorithmic solution, and every proof encodes
such a solution. Does not this sound exactly like what the constructivists have been calling for?
Unlike the mathematical or philosophical constructivism, however, and even unlike the early-day theory of computa-
tion, modern computer science has long understood that, what really matters, is not just computability, but rather eﬃcient
computability. So, the next natural step on the road of revealing the importance of CoL for computer science would be show-
ing that it can be used for studying eﬃcient computability just as successfully as for studying computability-in-principle.
Anyone familiar with the earlier work on CoL could have found reasons for optimistic expectations here. Namely, every prov-
able formula of any of the known sound axiomatizations of CoL happens to be a scheme of not only “always computable”
problems, but “always eﬃciently computable” problems just as well, whatever eﬃciency exactly means in the context of
interactive computation that CoL operates in. That is, at the level of pure logic, computability and eﬃcient computability
yield the same classes of valid principles. The study of logic abounds with phenomena in this style. One example would be
the well-known fact about classical logic, according to which validity with respect to all possible models is equivalent to
validity with respect to just models with countable domains.
At the level of reasonably expressive applied theories, however, one should certainly expect signiﬁcant differences de-
pending on whether the underlying concept of interest is eﬃcient computability or computability-in-principle. For instance,
the earlier-mentioned system CLA1 proves formulas expressing computable but often intractable arithmetical problems.
A purpose of the present paper is to construct a CoL-based system for arithmetic which, unlike CLA1, proves only eﬃciently
— speciﬁcally, polynomial time — computable problems. The new applied formal theory CLA4 presented in Section 11
achieves this purpose. It is also a good starting point for exploring the wider class of systems under the generic name
“clarithmetic” — arithmetical theories based on CoL, with CLA4 being a model example of complexity-oriented versions of
clarithmetic, a series of other variations of which, such as systems for polynomial space computability, primitive recursive
computability, PA-provably recursive computability and so on, are still to come in the near future (see [30,31]). Among
the main purposes of the present piece of writing is to introduce the promising world of clarithmetic to a relatively wide
audience. This explains the semitutorial style in which the paper is written. It targets readers with no prior familiarity with
CoL.
Just like CLA1, our present system CLA4 is not only a cognitive, but also a problem-solving tool: in order to ﬁnd a
solution for a given problem, it would be suﬃcient to write the problem in the language of the system, and ﬁnd a proof of
it. An algorithmic solution for the problem then would automatically come together with such a proof. However, unlike the
solutions extracted from CLA1-proofs, which might be intractable, the solutions extracted from CLA4-proofs would always
be eﬃcient.
Furthermore, CLA4 turns out to be not only sound, but also complete in a certain reasonable sense that we call ex-
tensional completeness. According to the latter, every number-theoretic computational problem that has a polynomial time
solution is represented by some theorem of CLA4. Taking into account that there are many ways to represent the same
problem, extensional completeness is weaker than what can be called intensional completeness, according to which any for-
mula representing an (eﬃciently) computable problem is provable. In these terms, Gödel’s celebrated theorem, here with
“truth” = “computability”, is about intensional rather than extensional incompleteness. In fact, extensional completeness is
not at all interesting in the context of classical-logic-based theories such as PA. In such theories, unlike CoL-based theories,
it is trivially achieved, as the provable formula  represents every true sentence.
Syntactically, our CLA4 is an extension of PA, and the semantics of the former is a conservative generalization of the
semantics of the latter. Namely, the formulas of PA, which form only a proper subclass of the formulas of CLA4, are seen
as special, “moveless” sorts of problems/games, automatically solved/won when true and failed/lost when false. This makes
the classical concept of truth just a special case of computability in our sense — it is nothing but computability restricted
to (the problems represented by) the traditional sorts of formulas. And this means that Gödel’s incompleteness theorems
automatically extend from PA to CLA4, so that, unlike extensional completeness, intensional completeness in CLA4 or any
other suﬃciently expressive sound CoL-based applied theory is impossible to achieve in principle. As for CLA1, it turns out
1 The paper [36] (in Chinese) is apparently another exception, focused on applications of CoL in AI.
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would be (not only intensionally but also) extensionally incomplete, as long as the semantics of the system is based on
unrestricted (as opposed to, say, eﬃcient) computability.
Among the main moral merits of the present investigation and its contributions to the overall CoL project is an illus-
tration of the fact that, in constructing CoL-based applied theories, successfully switching from computability to eﬃcient
computability is possible and even more than just possible. As noted, eﬃcient computability, in fact, turns out to be much
better behaved than computability-in-principle: the former allows us to achieve completeness in a sense in which the latter
yields inherent incompleteness.
An advanced reader will easily understand that the present paper, while focused on the system CLA4 of (cl)arithmetic,
in fact is not only about arithmetic, but also just as much about CoL-based applied theories or knowledge base systems in
general, with CLA4 only serving as a model example of such systems. Generally, the nonlogical axioms or the knowledge
base of a CoL-based applied system would be any collection of (formulas expressing) problems whose algorithmic or ef-
ﬁcient solutions are known. Sometimes, together with nonlogical axioms, we may also have nonlogical rules of inference,
preserving the property of computability or eﬃcient computability. Then, the soundness of the corresponding underlying
axiomatization of CoL (in our present case, it is system CL12 studied in [27,29]) — which usually comes in the strong form
called uniform-constructive soundness — guarantees that every theorem T of the theory also has an effective or eﬃcient so-
lution and that, furthermore, such a solution can be effectively or eﬃciently extracted from a proof of T . It is this fact that,
as mentioned, makes CoL-based systems problem-solving tools.
More speciﬁcally, eﬃciency-oriented systems in the above style and CLA4 in particular can be seen as programming
languages, where “programming” simply means theorem-proving. The soundness of the underlying system guarantees that
any proof that can be written will be translatable into a program that runs eﬃciently and indeed is a solution of the problem
expressed by the target formula of the proof. Note that the problem of verifying whether a program meets its speciﬁcation,
which is generally undecidable, is fully neutralized here: the “speciﬁcation” is nothing but the target formula of the proof,
and the proof itself, while encoding an eﬃcient program, also automatically serves as a veriﬁcation of the correctness
of that program. Furthermore, every step/formula of the proof can be viewed as its own (best possible) “comment”. In
a more ambitious and, at this point, somewhat fantastic perspective, after developing reasonable theorem-provers, CoL-
based eﬃciency-oriented systems can be seen as declarative programming languages in an extreme sense, where human
“programming” just means writing a formula expressing the problem whose eﬃcient solution is sought for systematic usage
in the future. That is, a program simply coincides with its speciﬁcation. The compiler’s job would be ﬁnding a proof (the
hard part) and translating it into a machine-language code (the easy part). The process of compiling could thus take long
but, once compiled, the program would run fast ever after.
Various complexity-oriented systems have been studied in the literature ([2,3,6–10,33,35] and more). A notable advan-
tage of CoL-based complexity-oriented systems over the other systems with similar aspirations, which typically happen to
be inherently weak systems, is having actually or potentially unlimited strength, with the latter including the full expressive
and deductive power of classical logic and Peano arithmetic. In view of the above-outlined potential applications, the im-
portance of this feature is obvious: the stronger a system, the better the chances that a proof/program will be found for a
declarative, non-preprocessed, ad hoc speciﬁcation of the goal. Among the other appealing features of clarithmetic is being
semantically meaningful in the full generality of its language, scalable, and easy to understand in its own right. Syntactically
it also tends to be remarkably simple. For instance, on top of the standard Peano axioms, our present system CLA4 only has
two additional axioms xunionsqy(y = x+ 1) and xunionsqy(y = 2x), one saying that the function x+ 1 is (eﬃciently) computable,
and the other saying the same about the function 2x. As will be seen later, from these two innocuous-looking axioms and
one (also very simple) rule of induction called CLA4-Induction, via CoL, one can obtain “practically full” information about
polynomial time computability of number-theoretic problems, in the same sense as PA, despite Gödel’s incompleteness,
allows us to obtain “practically full” information about arithmetical truth. To put it in other words, if a formula F is not
provable in CLA4, it is unlikely that anyone would ﬁnd a polynomial time algorithm solving the problem expressed by F :
either such an algorithm does not exist, or (as will be seen from Theorem 16.2) showing its correctness requires going
beyond ordinary combinatorial reasoning formalizable in PA.
The closest ancestor of our present system CLA4 is Buss’s bounded arithmetic for polynomial time. The similarity is related
to the single yet important fact that the above-mentioned rule of CLA4-Induction is nothing but an adaptation of Buss’s
PIND (“Polynomial Induction”) principle to the new semantical environment in which CLA4 operates. In this sense, CLA4
can be characterized as a “CoL-based bounded arithmetic”, as opposed to Buss’s original versions of bounded arithmetic
that are based on classical [6] or intuitionistic [7] logics. The switch to CoL as the logical basis for such theories creates
notable differences. Among the advantages offered by this switch is absolute ﬂexibility (as long as certain minimum-strength
requirements are satisﬁed) in selecting the underlying “purely arithmetical” axioms. Choosing the latter to be the kind old
axioms of Peano, as done in CLA4, allows us to achieve dramatically greater (than in the case of Buss’s systems) intensional
strength. Furthermore, as shown in Section 16, replacing Peano axioms with stronger ones can take us arbitrarily close to
intensional completeness. This is just as far as one can go in similar pursuits because, as already noted, in view of Gödel’s
incompleteness phenomenon, no particular recursively enumerable system can be intensionally complete. In contrast, even
“slightly” increasing the strength of the underlying (carefully hand-picked and intensionally very weak) set of arithmetical
axioms in classical-logic-based or intuitionistic-logic-based bounded arithmetic immediately results in loss of soundness.
We will come back to this topic in Section 17.
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Introducing and justifying CoL in full generality is not among the goals of the present paper — this job has been done in
[13,17,26]. We will reintroduce only as much of (the otherwise much wider) CoL as technically necessary for understanding
the system CLA4 based on it.
As noted, formulas in CoL represent computational problems. Such problems are understood as games between two
players: , called Machine, and ⊥, called Environment (these names will not always be capitalized, and may take articles
“a” or “the”). Machine is a mechanical device with fully determined, algorithmic behavior. On the other hand, there are no
restrictions on the behavior of Environment. A given machine is considered to be solving a given problem iff it wins the
corresponding game no matter how the environment acts.
Standard atomic sentences, such as “0= 0” or “Peggy is John’s mother”, are understood as special sorts of games, called
elementary. There are no moves in elementary games, and they are automatically won or lost. Speciﬁcally, the elementary
game represented by a true sentence is won (without making any moves) by Machine, and the elementary game represented
by a false sentence is won by Environment.
Logical operators are understood as operations on games/problems. One of the important groups of such operations,
termed choice operations, comprises , unionsq, , unionsq. These are called choice conjunction, choice disjunction, choice universal
quantiﬁer and choice existential quantiﬁer, respectively. A0  A1 is a game where the ﬁrst legal move (“choice”), which
should be either 0 or 1, is by ⊥. After such a move/choice i is made, the play continues and the winner is determined
according to the rules of Ai ; if a choice is never made, ⊥ loses. A0 unionsq A1 is deﬁned in a symmetric way with the roles of ⊥
and  interchanged: here it is  who makes an initial choice and who loses if such a choice is not made. With the universe
of discourse being {0,1,10,11,100, . . .} (natural numbers identiﬁed with their binary representations), the meanings of the
quantiﬁers  and unionsq can now be explained by
xA(x) = A(0)  A(1)  A(10)  A(11)  A(100)  · · ·
and
unionsqxA(x) = A(0) unionsq A(1) unionsq A(10) unionsq A(11) unionsq A(100) unionsq · · · .
So, for example,
x(Prime(x) unionsq Composite(x))
is a game where the ﬁrst move is by Environment. Such a move should consist in selecting a particular number n for x,
intuitively amounting to asking whether n is prime or composite. This move brings the game down to (in the sense that
the game continues as)
Prime(n) unionsq Composite(n).
Now Machine has to move, or else it loses. The move should consist in choosing one of the two disjuncts. Let us say the
left disjunct is chosen, which further brings the game down to Prime(n). The latter is an elementary game, and here the
interaction ends. Machine wins iff it has chosen a true disjunct. The choice of the left disjunct by Machine thus amounts to
claiming/answering that n is prime. Overall, as we see, x(Prime(x) unionsq Composite(x)) represents the problem of deciding the
primality question.2
Similarly,
xyunionsqz(z = x× y)
is the problem of computing the product of any two numbers. Here the ﬁrst two moves are by Environment, which selects
some particular m = x and n = y, thus asking Machine to tell what the product of m and n is. Machine wins if and only if,
in response, it selects a (the) number k for z such that k =m× n.
Another group of game operations dealt with in this paper comprises ¬,∧,∨,→. Employing the classical symbols for
these operations is no accident, as they are conservative generalizations of the corresponding Boolean operations from
elementary games to all games.
Negation ¬ is a role-switch operation: it turns ’s moves and wins into ⊥’s moves and wins, and vice versa. Since
elementary games have no moves, only the winners are switched there, so that, as noted, ¬ acts just as the ordinary
classical negation when applied to such games. For instance, as  is the winner in 0 + 1 = 1, the winner in ¬0 + 1 = 1
will be ⊥. That is,  wins the negation ¬A of an elementary game A iff it loses A, i.e., if A is false. As for the meaning
of negation when applied to nonelementary games, at this point it may be useful to observe that ¬ interacts with choice
operations in the kind old DeMorgan fashion. For example, it would not be hard to see that
¬xyunionsqz(z = x× y) =unionsqxunionsqyz(z 
= x× y).
2 For simplicity, here we treat “Composite” as the complement of “Prime”, even though, strictly speaking, this is not quite so: the numbers 0 and 1 are
neither prime nor composite. Writing “Nonprime” instead of “Composite” would easily correct this minor inaccuracy.
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A0 ∨ A1) means playing the two games in parallel where, in order to win,  needs to win in both (resp. at least one) of
the components Ai . It is obvious that, just as in the case of negation, ∧ and ∨ act as classical conjunction and disjunction
when applied to elementary games. For instance, 0+ 1 = 1∨ 0× 1 = 1 is a game automatically won by Machine. There are
no moves in it as there are no moves in either disjunct, and Machine is an automatic winner because it is so in the left
disjunct. To appreciate the difference between the two — choice and parallel — groups of connectives, compare
x(Prime(x) unionsq ¬Prime(x))
and
x(Prime(x)∨ ¬Prime(x)).
The former is a computationally nontrivial problem, existence of an easy (polynomial time) solution for which had remained
an open question until a few years ago. As for the latter, it is trivial, as Machine has nothing to do in it: the ﬁrst (and only)
move is by Environment, consisting in choosing a number n for x. Whatever n is chosen, Machine wins, as Prime(n) ∨
¬Prime(n) is a true sentence and hence an automatically -won elementary game.
The operation →, called strict reduction, is deﬁned by A → B = (¬A) ∨ B . Intuitively, this is indeed the problem of
reducing B to A: solving A → B means solving B while having A as an external computational resource. Resources are
symmetric to problems: what is a problem to solve for one player is a resource that the other player can use, and vice
versa. Since A is negated in (¬A)∨ B and negation means switching the roles, A appears as a resource rather than problem
for  in A → B .
Consider xunionsqy(y = x2). Anyone who knows the deﬁnition of x2 in terms of × (but perhaps does not know the meaning
of multiplication, or is unable to compute this function for whatever reason) would be able to solve the problem
zuunionsqv(v = z × u) →xunionsqy(y = x2), (1)
i.e., the problem
unionsqzunionsquv(v 
= z × u)∨xunionsqy(y = x2),
as it is about reducing the consequent to the antecedent. A solution here goes like this. Wait till Environment speciﬁes a
value n for x, i.e. asks “what is the square of n?”. Do not try to immediately answer this question, but rather specify the
same value n for both z and u, thus asking the counterquestion: “what is n times n?”. Environment will have to provide
a correct answer m to this counterquestion (i.e., specify v as m where m = n × n), or else it loses. Then, specify y as m,
and rest your case. Note that, in this solution, Machine did not have to compute multiplication, doing which had become
Environment’s responsibility. Machine only correctly reduced the problem of computing square to the problem of computing
product, which made it the winner.
Another group of operations that play an important role in CoL comprises ∀ and its dual ∃ (with ∃xA(x) = ¬∀x¬A(x)),
called blind universal quantiﬁer and blind existential quantiﬁer, respectively. ∀xA(x) can be thought of as a “version” ofxA(x) where the particular value of x that Environment selects is invisible to Machine, so that it has to play blindly in a
way that guarantees success no matter what that value is.
Compare the problems x(Even(x) unionsq Odd(x)) and ∀x(Even(x) unionsq Odd(x)). Both of them are about telling whether a given
number is even or odd; the difference is only in whether that “given number” is known to Machine or not. The ﬁrst problem
is an easy-to-win, two-move-deep game of a structure that we have already seen. The second game, on the other hand, is
one-move deep with only Machine to make a move — select the “true” disjunct, which is hardly possible to do as the value
of x remains unspeciﬁed.
Just like all other operations for which we use classical symbols, the meanings of ∀ and ∃ are exactly classical when
applied to elementary games. Having this full collection of classical operations makes CoL a generalization and conservative
extension of classical logic.
Going back to an earlier example, even though (1) expresses a “very easily solvable” problem, that formula is still not
logically valid. Note that the success of the reduction strategy of the consequent to the antecedent that we provided for
it relies on the nonlogical fact that x2 = x × x. That strategy would fail in a general case where the meanings of x2 and
x× x may not necessarily be the same. On the other hand, the goal of CoL as a general-purpose problem-solving tool should
be to allow us ﬁnd purely logical solutions, i.e., solutions that do not require any special, domain-speciﬁc knowledge and
(thus) would be good no matter what the particular predicate or function symbols of the formulas mean. Any knowledge
that might be relevant should be explicitly stated and included either in the antecedent of a given formula or in the set of
axioms (“implicit antecedents” for every potential formula) of a CoL-based theory. In our present case, formula (1) easily
turns into a logically valid one by adding, to its antecedent, the deﬁnition of square in terms of multiplication:
∀w(w2 = w × w)∧zuunionsqv(v = z × u) →xunionsqy(y = x2). (2)
The strategy that we provided earlier for (1) is just as good for (2), with the difference that it is successful for (2) no matter
what x2 and z×u mean, whereas, in the case of (1), it was guaranteed to be successful only under the standard arithmetical
interpretations of the square and product functions. Thus, our strategy for (2) is, in fact, a “purely logical” solution.
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problems. The following is an example of a winnable nonelementary ∀-game:
∀y(Even(y) unionsq Odd(y) →x(Even(x+ y) unionsq Odd(x+ y))). (3)
Solving this problem, which means reducing the consequent to the antecedent without knowing the value of y, is easy: 
waits till ⊥ selects a value n for x, and also tells — by selecting a unionsq-disjunct in the antecedent — whether y is even or
odd. Then, if n and y are both even or both odd,  chooses the left unionsq-disjunct in the consequent, otherwise it chooses the
right unionsq-disjunct. Replacing the ∀y preﬁx by y would signiﬁcantly weaken the problem, obligating Environment to specify
a value for y. Our strategy does not really need to know the exact value of y, as it only exploits the information about y’s
being even or odd, provided by the antecedent of the formula.
Many more — natural, meaningful and useful — operations beyond the ones discussed in this section have been in-
troduced and studied within the framework of CoL. Here we have only surveyed those that are relevant to our present
investigation.
3. Constant games
Now we are getting down to formal deﬁnitions of the concepts informally explained in the previous section.
To deﬁne games formally, we need certain technical terms and conventions. Let us agree that a move means any ﬁnite
string over the standard keyboard alphabet. A labeled move (labmove) is a move preﬁxed with  or ⊥, with such a preﬁx
(label) indicating which player has made the move. A run is a (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) sequence of labmoves, and a position is a
ﬁnite run.
We will be exclusively using the letters Γ,,Φ for runs, and α,β for moves. The letter ℘ will always be a variable for
players, and
℘
will mean “℘ ’s adversary” (“the other player”). Runs will be often delimited by “〈” and “〉”, with 〈 〉 thus denoting the empty
run. The meaning of an expression such as 〈Φ,℘α,Γ 〉 must be clear: this is the result of appending to the position 〈Φ〉
the labmove 〈℘α〉 and then the run 〈Γ 〉.
The following is a formal deﬁnition of what we call constant games, combined with some less formal conventions
regarding the usage of certain terminology.
Deﬁnition 3.1. A constant game is a pair A = (LrA,WnA), where:
1. LrA is a set of runs satisfying the condition that a (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) run is in LrA iff all of its nonempty ﬁnite initial
segments are in LrA (notice that this implies 〈 〉 ∈ LrA ). The elements of LrA are said to be legal runs of A, and all other
runs are said to be illegal. We say that α is a legal move for ℘ in a position Φ of A iff 〈Φ,℘α〉 ∈ LrA ; otherwise α is
illegal. When the last move of the shortest illegal initial segment of Γ is ℘-labeled, we say that Γ is a ℘-illegal run of A.
2. WnA is a function that sends every run Γ to one of the players  or ⊥, satisfying the condition that if Γ is a ℘-illegal
run of A, then WnA〈Γ 〉 = ℘ . When WnA〈Γ 〉 = ℘ , we say that Γ is a ℘-won (or won by ℘) run of A; otherwise Γ is lost
by ℘ . Thus, an illegal run is always lost by the player who has made the ﬁrst illegal move in it.
An important operation not explicitly mentioned in Section 2 is what is called preﬁxation. This operation takes two argu-
ments: a constant game A and a position Φ that must be a legal position of A (otherwise the operation is undeﬁned), and
returns the game 〈Φ〉A. Intuitively, 〈Φ〉A is the game playing which means playing A starting (continuing) from position Φ .
That is, 〈Φ〉A is the game to which A evolves (will be “brought down”) after the moves of Φ have been made. We have
already used this intuition when explaining the meaning of choice operations in Section 2: we said that after ⊥ makes
an initial move i ∈ {0,1}, the game A0  A1 continues as Ai . What this meant was nothing but that 〈⊥i〉(A0  A1) = Ai .
Similarly, 〈i〉(A0 unionsq A1) = Ai . Here is a deﬁnition of preﬁxation:
Deﬁnition 3.2. Let A be a constant game and Φ a legal position of A. The game 〈Φ〉A is deﬁned by:
• Lr〈Φ〉A = {Γ | 〈Φ,Γ 〉 ∈ LrA};
• Wn〈Φ〉A〈Γ 〉 =WnA〈Φ,Γ 〉.
A terminological convention important to remember is that we often identify a legal position Φ of a game A with
the game 〈Φ〉A. So, for instance, we may say that the move 1 by ⊥ brings the game B0  B1 down to the position B1.
Strictly speaking, B1 is not a position but a game, and what is a position is 〈⊥1〉, which we here identiﬁed with the game
B1 = 〈⊥1〉(B0  B1).
We say that a constant game A is ﬁnite-depth iff there is an integer d such that no legal run of A contains more than
d labmoves. The smallest of such integers d is called the depth of A. “Elementary” means “of depth 0”.
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simpler. Namely, in order to deﬁne a ﬁnite-depth-preserving game operation O (A1, . . . , An) applied to such games, it suﬃces
to specify the following:
(i) Who wins O (A1, . . . , An) if no moves are made, i.e., the value of WnO (A1,...,An)〈 〉.
(ii) What are the initial legal (lab)moves, i.e., the elements of {℘α | 〈℘α〉 ∈ LrO (A1,...,An)}, and to what game is the game
O (A1, . . . , An) brought down after such an initial legal labmove ℘α is made. Recall that, by saying that a given labmove
℘α brings a given game A down to B , we mean that 〈℘α〉A = B .
Then, the set of legal runs of O (A1, . . . , An) will be uniquely deﬁned, and so will be the winner in every legal (and hence
ﬁnite) run of the game.
Below we deﬁne a number of operations for ﬁnite-depth games only. Each of these operations can be easily seen to
preserve the ﬁnite-depth property. Of course, more general deﬁnitions of these operations — not restricted to ﬁnite-depth
games — do exist (see, e.g., [26]), but in this paper we are trying to keep things as simple as possible.
Deﬁnition 3.3. Let A, B , A0, A1, . . . be ﬁnite-depth constant games, and n be a positive integer.
1. ¬A is deﬁned by:
(i) Wn¬A〈 〉 = ℘ iff WnA〈 〉 = ℘ .
(ii) 〈℘α〉 ∈ Lr¬A iff 〈℘α〉 ∈ LrA . Such an initial legal labmove ℘α brings the game down to ¬〈℘α〉A.
2. A0  · · ·  An is deﬁned by:
(i) WnA0···An 〈 〉 = .
(ii) 〈℘α〉 ∈ LrA0···An iff ℘ = ⊥ and α = i ∈ {0, . . . ,n}.3 Such an initial legal labmove ⊥i brings the game down to Ai .
3. A0 ∧ · · · ∧ An is deﬁned by:
(i) WnA0∧···∧An 〈 〉 =  iff, for each i ∈ {0, . . . ,n}, WnAi 〈 〉 = .
(ii) 〈℘α〉 ∈ LrA0∧···∧An iff α = i.β , where i ∈ {0, . . . ,n} and 〈℘β〉 ∈ LrAi . Such an initial legal labmove ℘i.β brings the game
down to
A0 ∧ · · · ∧ Ai−1 ∧ 〈℘β〉Ai ∧ Ai+1 ∧ · · · ∧ An.
4. A0 unionsq · · · unionsq An and A0 ∨ · · · ∨ An are deﬁned exactly as A0  · · ·  An and A0 ∧ · · · ∧ An , respectively, only with “” and
“⊥” interchanged.
5. The inﬁnite -conjunction A0  A1  · · · is deﬁned exactly as A0  · · ·  An , only with “i ∈ {0,1, . . .}” instead of “i ∈
{0, . . . ,n}”. Similarly for the inﬁnite version of unionsq.
6. In addition to the earlier-established meanings, the symbols  and ⊥ also denote two special — simplest — constant
games, deﬁned by Wn〈 〉 = , Wn⊥〈 〉 = ⊥ and Lr = Lr⊥ = {〈 〉}.
7. A → B is treated as an abbreviation of (¬A)∨ B .
Example 3.4. The game (0= 0 0= 1) → (10= 11 10= 10), i.e. ¬(0= 0 0= 1)∨ (10= 11 10= 10), has thirteen legal
runs, which are:
1 〈〉. It is won by , because  is the winner in the right ∨-disjunct (consequent).
2 〈0.0〉. (The labmove of) this run brings the game down to ¬0= 0∨ (10= 11 10= 10), and  is the winner for
the same reason as in the previous case.
3 〈0.1〉. It brings the game down to ¬0 = 1 ∨ (10 = 11  10 = 10), and  is the winner because it wins in both
∨-disjuncts.
4 〈⊥1.0〉. It brings the game down to ¬(0= 0  0= 1)∨ 10= 11.  loses as it loses in both ∨-disjuncts.
5 〈⊥1.1〉. It brings the game down to ¬(0= 0  0= 1)∨ 10= 10.  wins as it wins in the right ∨-disjunct.
6–7 〈0.0,⊥1.0〉 and 〈⊥1.0,0.0〉. Both bring the game down to the false ¬0= 0∨ 10= 11, and both are lost by .
8–9 〈0.1,⊥1.0〉 and 〈⊥1.0,0.1〉. Both bring the game down to the true ¬0 = 1 ∨ 10 = 11, which makes  the
winner.
10–11 〈0.0,⊥1.1〉 and 〈⊥1.1,0.0〉. Both bring the game down to the true ¬0= 0∨ 10= 10, so  wins.
12–13 〈0.1,⊥1.1〉 and 〈⊥1.1,0.1〉. Both bring the game down to the true ¬0= 1∨ 10= 10, so  wins.
3 Here the number i is identiﬁed with the standard bit string representing it in the binary notation. The same applies to the other clauses of this
deﬁnition.
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Constant games can be seen as generalized propositions: while propositions in classical logic are just elements of {,⊥},
constant games are functions from runs to {,⊥}. As we know, however, propositions only offer very limited expressive
power, and classical logic needs to consider the more general concept of predicates, with propositions being nothing but
special — constant — cases of predicates. The situation in CoL is similar. Our concept of a (simply) game generalizes that of
a constant game in the same sense as the classical concept of a predicate generalizes that of a proposition.
We ﬁx an inﬁnite set of expressions called variables, for which we will be using x, y, z, s, r, t,u, v,w as metavariables.
An expression like x will usually stand for a ﬁnite sequence of variables. Similarly for later-deﬁned objects such as constants
or terms.
We also ﬁx another inﬁnite set of expressions called constants:
{,1,10,11,100,101,110,111,1000, . . .}.
These are thus binary numerals — the strings matching the regular expression  ∪ 1(0 ∪ 1)∗ , where  is the empty string.
We will be typically identifying such strings — by some rather innocent abuse of concepts — with the natural numbers
represented by them in the standard binary notation, and vice versa. Note that  represents 0. For this reason, following the
many-century tradition, we shall usually write 0 instead of  , keeping in mind that, in such contexts, the length |0| of the
string 0 should be seen to be 0 rather than 1. We will be mostly using a, b, c, d as metavariables for constants.
A universe (of discourse) is a pair (U , U ), where U is a nonempty set, and U , called the naming function of the universe,
is a function that sends each constant c to an element cU of U . The intuitive meaning of cU = s is that c is a name of s.
Both terminologically and notationally, we will typically identify each universe (U , U ) with its ﬁrst component and, instead
of “(U , U )”, write simply “U ”, keeping in mind that each such “universe” U comes with a ﬁxed associated function U .
A universe U = (U , U ) is said to be ideal iff U coincides with the above-ﬁxed set of constants, and U is the identity function
on that set. Note that, in a non-ideal universe, such as the set of all real numbers, some objects may have several names
(e.g., 1/3,2/6,3/9 are different names of the same number), some have unique names (e.g. the famous number π ), and
some have no names at all. The same applies to the universe of astronomy, where some stars and planets have unique
names, some have several names (Venus = Morning Star = Evening Star), and most have no names at all. On the other
hand, the standard universe of arithmetic is ideal: every natural number has a unique name — the corresponding binary
numeral — with which it can be identiﬁed.
By a valuation on a universe U , or a U -valuation, we mean a mapping e that sends each variable x to an element
e(x) of U . When a universe U is ﬁxed, irrelevant or clear from the context, we may omit references to it and simply
say “valuation”. In these terms, a classical predicate p can be understood as a function that sends each valuation e to a
proposition, i.e., to a constant predicate. Similarly, what we call a game sends valuations to constant games:
Deﬁnition 4.1. Let U be a universe. A game on U is a function A from U -valuations to constant games. We write e[A]
(rather than A(e)) to denote the constant game returned by A on valuation e. Such a constant game e[A] is said to be an
instance of A. For readability, we usually write LrAe and Wn
A
e instead of Lr
e[A] and Wne[A] .
Just as this is the case with propositions versus predicates, constant games in the sense of Deﬁnition 3.1 will be thought
of as special, constant cases of games in the sense of Deﬁnition 4.1. In particular, each constant game A′ is the game A such
that, for every valuation e, e[A] = A′ . From now on we will no longer distinguish between such A and A′ , so that, if A is a
constant game, it is its own instance, with A = e[A] for every e.
Where n is a natural number, we say that a game A is n-ary iff there are n variables such that, for any two valuations
e1 and e2 that agree on all those variables, we have e1[A] = e2[A]. Generally, a game that is n-ary for some n, is said to be
ﬁnitary. Our paper is going to exclusively deal with ﬁnitary games and, for this reason, we agree that, from now on, when
we say “game”, we usually mean “ﬁnitary game”.
For a variable x and valuations e1, e2, we write e1 ≡x e2 to mean that the two valuations have the same universe and
agree on all variables other than x.
We say that a game A depends on a variable x iff there are two valuations e1, e2 with e1 ≡x e2 such that e1[A] 
= e2[A].
An n-ary game thus depends on at most n variables. And constant games are nothing but 0-ary games, i.e., games that do
not depend on any variables.
We say that a (not necessarily constant) game A is elementary iff so are all of its instances e[A]. And we say that A is
ﬁnite-depth iff there is a (smallest) integer d, called the depth of A, such that the depth of no instance of A exceeds d.
Just as constant games are generalized propositions, games can be treated as generalized predicates. Namely, we will
see each predicate p of whatever arity as the same-arity elementary game such that, for every valuation e, Wnpe 〈 〉 = 
iff p is true at e. And vice versa: every elementary game p will be seen as the same-arity predicate which is true at a
given valuation e iff Wnpe 〈 〉 = . Thus, for us, “predicate” and “elementary game” are going to be synonyms. Accordingly,
any standard terminological or notational conventions familiar from the literature for predicates also apply to them seen as
elementary games.
Just as the Boolean operations straightforwardly extend from propositions to all predicates, our operations ¬,∧,∨,→,
,unionsq extend from constant games to all games. This is done by simply stipulating that e[· · ·] commutes with all of those
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tion e, e[A  B] = e[A]  e[B]; etc. So does the operation of preﬁxation: provided that Φ is a legal position of every instance
of A, 〈Φ〉A is understood as the unique game such that, for every valuation e, e[〈Φ〉A] = 〈Φ〉e[A].
Deﬁnition 4.2. Let A be a ﬁnite-depth game on a universe U , x1, . . . , xn be pairwise distinct variables, and c1, . . . , cn be
constants. On the same universe, the game which we call the result of substituting x1, . . . , xn by c1, . . . , cn in A, denoted
A(x1/c1, . . . , xn/cn), is deﬁned by stipulating that, for every valuation e on U , e[A(x1/c1, . . . , xn/cn)] = e′[A], where e′ is the
valuation on U that sends each xi to ci and agrees with e on all other variables.
Following the standard readability-improving practice established in the literature for predicates, we will often ﬁx pair-
wise distinct variables x1, . . . , xn for a game A and write A as A(x1, . . . , xn). Representing A in this form sets a context in
which we can write A(c1, . . . , cn) to mean the same as the more clumsy expression A(x1/c1, . . . , xn/cn).
Deﬁnition 4.3. Let A(x) be a ﬁnite-depth game on a given universe. On the same universe, xA(x) and unionsqxA(x) are deﬁned
as the following two games, respectively:
A(0)  A(1)  A(10)  A(11)  A(100)  · · · ;
A(0) unionsq A(1) unionsq A(10) unionsq A(11) unionsq A(100) unionsq · · · .
Thus, every initial legal move of xA(x) or unionsqxA(x) is a constant c ∈ {0,1,10,11,100, . . .}, which in our informal lan-
guage we may refer to as “the constant chosen (by the corresponding player) for x”.
We will say that a game A is unistructural iff, for any two valuations e1 and e2, LrAe1 = LrAe2 . Of course, all constant
or elementary games are unistructural. It can also be easily seen that all our game operations preserve the unistructural
property of games. For the purposes of the present paper, considering only unistructural games would be suﬃcient.
We deﬁne the remaining operations ∀ and ∃ only for unistructural games:
Deﬁnition 4.4. Below A(x) is an arbitrary ﬁnite-depth unistructural game on a universe U . On the same universe:
1. The game ∀xA(x) is deﬁned by stipulating that, for every U -valuation e, player ℘ and move α, we have:
(i) Wn∀xA(x)e 〈 〉 =  iff, for every valuation g with g ≡x e, WnA(x)g 〈 〉 = .
(ii) 〈℘α〉 ∈ Lr∀xA(x)e iff 〈℘α〉 ∈ LrA(x)e . Such an initial legal labmove ℘α brings the game e[∀xA(x)] down to e[∀x〈℘α〉A(x)].
2. The game ∃xA(x) is deﬁned in exactly the same way, only with  and ⊥ interchanged.
Example 4.5. Consider the game (3) on the ideal universe, discussed earlier in Section 2. The sequence 〈⊥1.11, ⊥0.0, 1.1〉
is a legal run of (3), the effects of the moves of which are shown below:
(3): ∀y(Even(y) unionsq Odd(y) →x(Even(x+ y) unionsq Odd(x+ y)))
〈⊥1.11〉(3): ∀y(Even(y) unionsq Odd(y) → Even(11+ y) unionsq Odd(11+ y))
〈⊥1.11,⊥0.0〉(3): ∀y(Even(y) → Even(11+ y) unionsq Odd(11+ y))
〈⊥1.11,⊥0.0,1.1〉(3): ∀y(Even(y) → Odd(11+ y))
The play hits (ends as) the true proposition ∀y(Even(y) → Odd(11+ y)) and hence is won by .
Before closing this section, we want to make the rather straightforward observation that the DeMorgan dualities hold for
all of our sorts of conjunctions, disjunctions and quantiﬁers, and so does the double negation principle. That is, we always
have:
¬¬A = A;
¬(A ∧ B) = ¬A ∨ ¬B; ¬(A ∨ B) = ¬A ∧ ¬B;
¬(A  B) = ¬A unionsq ¬B; ¬(A unionsq B) = ¬A  ¬B;
¬∀xA(x) = ∃x¬A(x); ¬∃xA(x) = ∀x¬A(x);
¬xA(x) =unionsqx¬A(x); ¬unionsqxA(x) =x¬A(x).
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In traditional game-semantical approaches, including Blass’s [4,5] approach which is the closest precursor of ours, player’s
strategies are understood as functions — typically as functions from interaction histories (positions) to moves, or sometimes
[1] as functions that only look at the latest move of the history. This strategies-as-functions approach, however, is inapplica-
ble in the context of CoL, whose relaxed semantics, in striving to get rid of “bureaucratic pollutants” and only deal with the
remaining true essence of games, does not impose any regulations on which player can or should move in a given situation.
Here, in many cases, either player may have (legal) moves, and then it is unclear whether the next move should be the one
prescribed by ’s strategy function or the one prescribed by the strategy function of ⊥. For a game semantics whose am-
bition is to provide a comprehensive, natural and direct tool for modeling interaction, the strategies-as-functions approach
would be less than adequate, even if technically possible. This is so for the simple reason that the strategies that real com-
puters follow are not functions. If the strategy of your personal computer was a function from the history of interaction
with you, then its performance would keep noticeably worsening due to the need to read the continuously lengthening —
and, in fact, practically inﬁnite — interaction history every time before responding. Fully ignoring that history and looking
only at your latest keystroke in the spirit of [1] is also not what your computer does, either.
In CoL, (’s effective) strategies are deﬁned in terms of interactive machines, where computation is one continuous
process interspersed with — and inﬂuenced by — multiple “input” (environment’s moves) and “output” (machine’s moves)
events. Of several, seemingly rather different yet equivalent, machine models of interactive computation studied in CoL, here
we will employ the most basic, HPM (“Hard-Play Machine”) model.
An HPM is nothing but a Turing machine with the additional capability of making moves. The adversary can also move at
any time, with such moves being the only nondeterministic events from the machine’s perspective. Along with the ordinary
work tape, the machine has an additional tape called the run tape. The latter, serving as a dynamic input, at any time spells
the “current position” of the play. Its role is to make the run fully visible to the machine.
In these terms, an algorithmic solution (’s winning strategy) for a given constant game A is understood as an HPM
M such that, no matter how the environment acts during its interaction with M (what moves it makes and when), the
run incrementally spelled on the run tape is a -won run of A. As for ⊥’s strategies, there is no need to deﬁne them: all
possible behaviors by ⊥ are accounted for by the different possible nondeterministic updates of the run tape of an HPM.
In the above outline, we described HPMs in a relaxed fashion, without being speciﬁc about technical details such as,
say, how, exactly, moves are made by the machine, how many moves either player can make at once, what happens if
both players attempt to move “simultaneously”, etc. As it turns out, all reasonable design choices yield the same class
of winnable games as long as we consider a certain natural subclass of games called static. Such games are obtained by
imposing a certain simple formal condition on games (see, e.g., [26, Section 5]), which we do not reproduce here as nothing
in this paper relies on it. We shall only point out that, intuitively, static games are interactive tasks where the relative
speeds of the players are irrelevant, as it never hurts a player to postpone making moves. In other words, static games are
games that are contests of intellect rather than contests of speed. And one of the theses that CoL philosophically relies on is
that static games present an adequate formal counterpart of our intuitive concept of “pure”, speed-independent interactive
computational problems. Correspondingly, CoL restricts its attention (more speciﬁcally, possible interpretations of the atoms
of its formal language) to static games. All elementary games turn out to be trivially static, and the class of static games
turns out to be closed under all game operations studied in CoL. More speciﬁcally, all games expressible in the language
of the later-deﬁned logic CL12, or theory CLA4, are static, as well as constant, ﬁnitary and ﬁnite-depth. Accordingly, we
agree that, in this paper, we shall use the term “computational problem”, or simply “problem”, as a synonym of “constant,
ﬁnitary, ﬁnite-depth, static game”.
6. The HPMmodel in greater detail
As noted, computability of static games is rather robust with respect to the technical details of the underlying model of
interaction. And the loose description of HPMs that we gave in the previous section would be suﬃcient for most purposes,
just as mankind had been rather comfortably studying and using algorithms long before the Church–Turing thesis in its
precise form came around. Namely, relying on just the intuitive concept of algorithmic strategies (believed in CoL to be
adequately captured by the HPM model) would be suﬃcient if we only needed to show existence of such strategies for
various games. As it happens, however, later sections of this paper need to arithmetize such strategies in order to prove
the promised extensional completeness of CLA4. The complexity-theoretic concepts deﬁned in the next section also require
certain more speciﬁc details about HPMs, and in this section we provide such details. It should be pointed out again that
most — if not all — of such details are “negotiable”, as different reasonable arrangements would yield equivalent models.
Just like an ordinary Turing machine, an HPM has a ﬁnite set of states, one of which has the special status of being
the start state. There are no accept, reject, or halt states, but there are specially designated states called move states. It is
assumed that the start state is not among the move states. As noted earlier, this is a two-tape machine, with a read-write
work tape and read-only run tape. Each tape has a beginning but no end, and is divided into inﬁnitely many cells, arranged
in the left-to-right order: cell #0, cell #1, cell #2, etc. At any time, each cell will contain one symbol from a certain ﬁxed
ﬁnite set of tape symbols. The blank symbol, as well as  and ⊥, are among the tape symbols. We also assume that these
three symbols are not among the symbols that any (legal or illegal) move can ever contain. Either tape has its own scanning
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cycle”) to another happens according to the ﬁxed transition function of the machine. The latter, depending on the current
state, and the symbols seen by the two heads on the corresponding tapes, deterministically prescribes the next state, the
tape symbol by which the old symbol should be overwritten in the current cell (the cell currently scanned by the head)
of the work tape, and, for each head, the direction — one cell left or one cell right — in which the head should move.
A constraint here is that the blank symbol,  or ⊥ can never be written by the machine on the work tape. An attempt to
move left when the head of a given tape is looking at the leftmost cell results in staying put. So does an attempt to move
right when the head is looking at the blank symbol.
When the machine starts working, it is in its start state, both scanning heads are looking at the leftmost cells of the
corresponding tapes, and (all cells of) both tapes are blank (i.e., contain the blank symbol). Whenever the machine enters
a move state, the string α spelled by (the contents of) its work tape cells, starting from cell #0 and ending with the cell
immediately left to the work-tape scanning head, will be automatically appended — at the beginning of the next clock
cycle — to the contents of the run tape in the -preﬁxed form α. And, on every transition, whether the machine is in
a move state or not, any ﬁnite sequence ⊥β1, . . . ,⊥βm of ⊥-labeled moves may be nondeterministically appended to the
contents of the run tape. If the above two events happen on the same clock cycle, then the moves will be appended to the
contents of the run tape in the following order: α⊥β1 · · ·⊥βm (note the technicality that labmoves are listed on the run
tape without blanks or commas between them).
With each labmove that emerges on the run tape, we associate its timestamp, which is the number of the clock cycle
immediately preceding the cycle on which the move ﬁrst emerged on the run tape. Intuitively, the timestamp indicates on
which cycle the move was made rather than appeared on the run tape: a move made during cycle #i appears on the run
tape on cycle #i + 1 rather than #i. Also, we agree that the count of clock cycles, just like the count of cells, starts from 0,
meaning that the very ﬁrst clock cycle is cycle #0 rather than #1.
A conﬁguration of a given HPM M is a full description of the contents of the two tapes, the locations of the two
scanning heads, and the state of the machine at the beginning of some (“current”) clock cycle. A computation branch
of M is an inﬁnite sequence C0,C1,C2, . . . of conﬁgurations of M, where C0 is the initial conﬁguration (as explained
earlier), and every Ci+1 is a conﬁguration that could have legally followed (again, in the sense explained earlier) Ci . For
a computation branch B , the run spelled by B is the run Γ incrementally spelled on the run tape in the corresponding
scenario of interaction. We say that such a Γ is a run generated by the machine.
We say that a given HPM M wins (computes, solves) a given constant game A — and write M | A — iff every run Γ
generated by M is a -won run of A. We say that A is computable iff there is an HPM M such that M | A; such an
HPM is said to be an (algorithmic) solution, or winning strategy, for A.
7. Interactive complexity
The size of a move α means the length of α as a string. In the context of a given computation branch of a given HPM M,
by the background of a clock cycle c we mean the greatest of the sizes of Environment’s moves made by (before) time c,
or 0 if there are no such moves. If M makes a move on cycle c, then the background of that move4 means the background
of c. Next, whenever M makes a move on cycle c, by the timecost of that move we mean c − d, where d is the greatest
cycle with d < c on which a move was made by either player, or is 0 if there is no such cycle.
Throughout this paper, an n-ary arithmetical function means a function from n-tuples of natural numbers to natural
numbers. As always, “unary” means “1-ary”.
Deﬁnition 7.1. Let h be a unary arithmetical function, and M an HPM.
1. We say that M runs in time h, or that M is an h time machine, or that h is a bound for the time complexity of M,
iff, in every play (computation branch), for any clock cycle c on which M makes a move, neither the timecost nor the size
of that move exceeds h(
), where 
 is the background of c.
2. We say that M runs in space h, or that M is an h space machine, or that h is a bound for the space complexity
of M, iff, in every play (computation branch), for any clock cycle c, the number of cells ever visited by the work-tape head
of M by time c does not exceed h(
), where 
 is the background of c.
Our time complexity concept can be seen to be in the spirit of what is usually called response time. The latter generally
does not and should not depend on the length of the preceding interaction history. On the other hand, it is not and should
not be merely a function of the adversary’s last move, either. A similar characterization applies to our concept of space
complexity. Both complexity measures are equally meaningful whether it be in the context of “short-lasting” games (such
as the ones represented by the formulas of the later-deﬁned logic CL12) or the context of games that may have “very long”
and even inﬁnitely long legal runs.
4 As easily understood, here and in similar contexts, “move” means a move not as a string, but as an event, namely, the event ofM making a move at
time c.
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in time h, or that M is an h time solution for A, iff M is an h time machine with M | A. We say that A is computable
(winnable, solvable) in time h iff it has an h time solution. Similarly for “space” instead of “time”.
When we say polynomial time, it is to be understood as “time h for some polynomial function h”. Similarly for polyno-
mial space.
Many concepts introduced within the framework of CoL are generalizations — for the interactive context — of ordinary
and well-studied concepts of the traditional theory of computation. The above-deﬁned time and space complexities are
among such concepts. Let us focus on polynomial time for the rest of this section, and look at the traditional notion of
polynomial time computability of a function f (x) for instance. With a moment’s thought, it can be seen to be equivalent
to polynomial time computability (in our sense) of the problem xunionsqy(y = f (x)). Similarly, polynomial time decidability
of a predicate p(x) means the same as polynomial time computability of the problem x(¬p(x) unionsq p(x)). Further, what is
traditionally called (mapping) polynomial time reducibility of a predicate p(x) to a predicate q(x) can be seen to mean nothing
but polynomial time computability of the problem xunionsqy(p(x) ↔ q(y)), where E ↔ F is an abbreviation of (E → F )∧ (F →
E). If we want to say that a particular function f (x) is a polynomial time reduction of p(x) to q(x), then we can writexunionsqy(y = f (x))∧ ∀x(p(x) ↔ q( f (x))). And so on.
Our formalism can be used for systematically deﬁning and studying an inﬁnite variety of meaningful complexity-theoretic
properties, relations and operations, only some of which (as the above ones) may have established names in the literature.
Consider, for instance, the problem
x(¬q(x) unionsq q(x)) →x(¬p(x) unionsq p(x)). (4)
It expresses (its polynomial time computability means, that is) a sort of polynomial time reducibility of p(x) to q(x). This
reducibility can be seen to be strictly weaker than the traditional sort of polynomial time reducibility captured by the earlier
mentioned xunionsqy(y = f (x)). For instance, every predicate p(x) is reducible to its complement ¬p(x) in the sense of (4).
Namely, a polynomial time strategy for
x(p(x) unionsq ¬p(x)) →x(¬p(x) unionsq p(x))
goes as follows. Wait till a value n for x is speciﬁed in the consequent. Then specify the same value for x in the antecedent.
Further wait till a unionsq-disjunct is selected in the antecedent. If the ﬁrst (resp. second) disjunct is selected there, select the
second (resp. ﬁrst) unionsq-disjunct in the consequent, and celebrate victory. On the other hand, we cannot say that every pred-
icate p(x) is also polynomial time reducible — in the sense of xunionsqy(y = f (x)) — to its complement. Take p(x) to be any
coNP-complete predicate. If it was polynomial time reducible to its complement, then we would have NP = coNP.
8. The language of logic CL12 and its semantics
Logic CL12 will be axiomatically constructed in Section 9. The present section is merely devoted to its language. The
building blocks of the formulas of the latter are:
• Nonlogical predicate letters, for which we use p,q as metavariables. With each predicate letter is associated a ﬁxed
nonnegative integer called its arity. We assume that, for any n, there are inﬁnitely many n-ary predicate letters.
• Function letters, for which we use f , g as metavariables. Again, each function letter comes with a ﬁxed arity, and we
assume that, for any n, there are inﬁnitely many n-ary function letters.
• The binary logical predicate letter =.
• Inﬁnitely many variables and constants. These are the same as the ones ﬁxed in Section 4.
Terms, for which we use τ ,ψ, ξ,χ, θ,η as metavariables, are built from variables, constants and function letters in the
standard way. An atomic formula is p(τ1, . . . , τn), where p is an n-ary predicate letter and the τi are terms. When p is 0-
ary, we write p instead of p(). Also, we write τ1 = τ2 instead of = (τ1, τ2), and τ1 
= τ2 instead of ¬(τ1 = τ2). Formulas are
built from atomic formulas, propositional connectives ,⊥ (0-ary), ¬ (1-ary), ∧,∨,,unionsq (2-ary), variables and quantiﬁers
∀,∃,,unionsq in the standard way, with the exception that, oﬃcially, ¬ is only allowed to be applied to atomic formulas. The
deﬁnitions of free and bound occurrences of variables are also standard (with ,unionsq acting as quantiﬁers along with ∀,∃).
A formula with no free occurrences of variables is said to be closed.
Note that, terminologically,  and ⊥ do not count as atoms. For us, atoms are formulas containing no logical operators.
The formulas  and ⊥ do not qualify because they are (0-ary) logical operators themselves.
¬E , where E is not atomic, will be understood as a standard abbreviation: ¬ = ⊥, ¬¬E = E , ¬(A ∧ B) = ¬A ∨ ¬B ,
¬xE = unionsqx¬E , etc. And E → F will be understood as an abbreviation of ¬E ∨ F .
Parentheses will often be omitted — as we just did — if there is no danger of ambiguity. When omitting parentheses,
we assume that ¬ and the quantiﬁers have the highest precedence, and → has the lowest precedence. An expression
E1 ∧ · · ·∧ En , where n 2, is to be understood as E1 ∧ (E2 ∧ (· · · ∧ (En−1 ∧ En) · · ·)). Sometimes we can write this expression
for an unspeciﬁed n  0 (rather than n  2). Such a formula, in the case of n = 1, should be understood as simply E1.
Similarly for ∨,,unionsq. As for the case of n = 0, ∧ and  should be understood as  while ∨ and unionsq as ⊥.
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necessarily mean that each si has a free occurrence in F , or that every variable occurring free in F is among s1, . . . , sn .
However, it will always be assumed (usually only implicitly) that the si are pairwise distinct, and have no bound occurrences
in F . In the context set by the above representation, F (τ1, . . . , τn) will mean the result of replacing, in F , each occurrence
of each si by term τi . When writing F (τ1, . . . , τn), it will always be assumed (again, usually only implicitly) that the terms
τ1, . . . , τn contain no variables that have bound occurrences in F , so that there are no unpleasant collisions of variables
when doing replacements.
Similar — well established in the literature — notational conventions apply to terms.
A sequent is an expression E1, . . . , En ◦— F , where E1, . . . , En (n  0) and F are formulas. Here E1, . . . , En is said to be
the antecedent of the sequent, and F said to be the succedent.
By a free (resp. bound) variable of a sequent we shall mean a variable that has a free (resp. bound) occurrence in one of
the formulas of the sequent. For safety and simplicity, throughout the rest of this paper we assume that the sets of all free
and bound variables of any formula or sequent that we ever consider — unless strictly implied otherwise by the context —
are disjoint. This restriction, of course, does not yield any loss of expressive power, as variables can always be renamed so
as to satisfy this condition.
An interpretation is a pair (U ,∗ ), where U = (U , U ) is a universe and ∗ is a function that sends:
• every n-ary function letter f to a function f ∗ :Un → U ;
• every nonlogical n-ary predicate letter p to an n-ary predicate (elementary game) p∗(s1, . . . , sn) on U which does not
depend on any variables other than s1, . . . , sn .
The above uniquely extends to a mapping that sends each term τ to a function τ ∗ , and each formula F to a game F ∗ ,
by stipulating that:
1. c∗ = cU (any constant c).
2. s∗ = s (any variable s).
3. Where f is an n-ary function letter and τ1, . . . , τn are terms, ( f (τ1, . . . , τn))∗ = f ∗(τ ∗1 , . . . , τ ∗n ).
4. Where τ1 and τ2 are terms, (τ1 = τ2)∗ is τ ∗1 = τ ∗2 .
5. Where p is an n-ary nonlogical predicate letter and τ1, . . . , τn are terms, (p(τ1, . . . , τn))∗ = p∗(τ ∗1 , . . . , τ ∗n ).
6. ∗ commutes with all logical operators, seeing them as the corresponding game operations: ⊥∗ = ⊥, (E1 ∧ · · · ∧ En)∗ =
E∗1 ∧ · · · ∧ E∗n , (xE)∗ = x(E∗), etc.
While an interpretation is a pair (U ,∗ ), terminologically and notationally we will usually identify it with its second
component and write ∗ instead of (U ,∗ ), keeping in mind that every such “interpretation” ∗ comes with a ﬁxed universe U ,
said to be the universe of ∗ . When O is a function letter, a predicate letter, a constant or a formula, and O ∗ = W , we say
that ∗ interprets O as W . We can also refer to such a W as “O under interpretation ∗”.
When a given formula is represented as F (x1, . . . , xn), we will typically write F ∗(x1, . . . , xn) instead of (F (x1, . . . , xn))∗ .
A similar practice will be used for terms as well.
We agree that, for a formula F , an interpretation ∗ and an HPM M, whenever we say that M is a solution of F ∗ or
write M | F ∗ , we mean that M is a solution of the (constant) game x1 · · ·xn(F ∗), where x1, . . . , xn are exactly the free
variables of F , listed according to their lexicographic order. We call the above game the -closure of F ∗ , and denote it byF ∗ . The ∀-closure ∀F ∗ is deﬁned similarly. The same notational convention extends from games to formulas.
Note that, for any given formula F , the Lr component of the game F ∗ does not depend on the interpretation ∗ . Hence
we can safely say “legal run of F ” without indicating an interpretation applied to the formula.
9. The axiomatization of logic CL12
Our formulations rely on some terminology and notation, explained below.
A formula not containing any choice operators ,unionsq,,unionsq — i.e., a formula of the language of classical ﬁrst order logic —
is said to be elementary. A sequent is elementary iff all of its formulas are so.
The elementarization
‖F‖
of a formula F is the result of replacing in F all unionsq- and unionsq-subformulas by ⊥, and all - and -subformulas by . Note
that ‖F‖ is (indeed) an elementary formula. The elementarization ‖G1, . . . ,Gn ◦— F‖ of a sequent G1, . . . ,Gn ◦— F is the
elementary formula ‖G1‖ ∧ · · · ∧ ‖Gn‖ → ‖F‖.
A sequent is said to be stable iff its elementarization is classically valid. By “classical validity”, in view of Gödel’s com-
pleteness theorem, we mean provability in some standard classical ﬁrst-order calculus with constants, function letters and
=, where = is treated as the logical identity predicate (so that, say, x= x, x= y → (E(x) → E(y)), etc. are provable).
A surface occurrence of a subformula is an occurrence that is not in the scope of any choice operators.
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F [E]
to mean a formula F together with some (single) ﬁxed surface occurrence of a subformula E . Using this notation sets a
context, in which F [H] will mean the result of replacing in F [E] the (ﬁxed) occurrence of E by H . Note that here we are
talking about some occurrence of E . Only that occurrence gets replaced when moving from F [E] to F [H], even if the formula
also had some other occurrences of E .
By a rule (of inference) in this section we mean a binary relation YRX , where Y = 〈Y1, . . . , Yn〉 is a ﬁnite sequence of
sequents and X is a sequent. Instances of such a relation are schematically written as
Y1, . . . , Yn
X
,
where Y1, . . . , Yn are called the premises, and X is called the conclusion. Whenever YRX holds, we say that X follows
from Y by R.
Expressions such as G, K , . . . will usually stand for ﬁnite sequences of formulas. The standard meaning of an expression
such as G, F , K should also be clear.
THE RULES OF CL12
CL12 has the six rules listed below, with the following additional conditions/explanations:
1. In unionsq-Choose and -Choose, i ∈ {0,1}.
2. In unionsq-Choose and -Choose, t is either a constant or a variable with no bound occurrences in the premise, and H(t) is
the result of replacing by t all free occurrences of x in H(x) (rather than vice versa).
unionsq-Choose
G ◦— F [Hi]
G ◦— F [H0 unionsq H1]
-Choose
G, E[Hi], K ◦— F
G, E[H0  H1], K ◦— F
-Choose
G, E[H(t)], K ◦— F
G, E[xH(x)], K ◦— F
unionsq-Choose
G ◦— F [H(t)]
G ◦— F [unionsqxH(x)]
Replicate
G, E, K ◦— F
G, E, K , E ◦— F
Wait
Y1, . . . , Yn
(n 0), where all of the following ﬁve conditions are satisﬁed:
X
1. -Condition: Whenever X has the form G ◦— F [H0  H1], both of the sequents G ◦— F [H0] and G ◦— F [H1] are among
Y1, . . . , Yn .
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F are among Y1, . . . , Yn .
3. -Condition: Whenever X has the form G ◦— F [xH(x)], for some variable y not occurring in X , the sequent G ◦—
F [H(y)] is among Y1, . . . , Yn . Here and below, H(y) is the result of replacing by y all free occurrences of x in H(x)
(rather than vice versa).
4. unionsq-Condition: Whenever X has the form G, E[unionsqxH(x)], K ◦— F , for some variable y not occurring in X , the sequent
G, E[H(y)], K ◦— F is among Y1, . . . , Yn .
5. Stability Condition: X is stable.
A CL12-proof of a sequent X is a sequence X1, . . . , Xn of sequents, with Xn = X , such that, each Xi follows by one of the
rules of CL12 from some (possibly empty in the case of Wait, and certainly empty in the case of i = 1) set P of premises
such that P ⊆ {X1, . . . , Xi−1}. When a CL12-proof of X exists, we say that X is provable in CL12, and write CL12  X .
A CL12-proof of a formula F will be understood as a CL12-proof of the empty-antecedent sequent ◦—F . Accordingly,
CL12  F means CL12  ◦—F .
CL12 is a conservative extension of classical logic (see [27]). Namely, an elementary sequent E1, . . . , En ◦— F is provable
in CL12 iff the formula E1 ∧ · · · ∧ En → F is valid in the classical sense. It is also a conservative extension of the earlier
known logic CL3 studied in [18].5 The latter is nothing but the empty-antecedent fragment of CL12 without function letters
and identity.
Example 9.1. In this example, × is a binary function letter and 3 is a unary function letter. We write x× y and x3 instead
of ×(x, y) and 3(x), respectively. The following sequence of sequents is a CL12-proof (of its last sequent):
1. ∀x(x3 = (x× x)× x), t = s × s, r = t × s ◦— r = s3 Wait: (no premises)
2. ∀x(x3 = (x× x)× x), t = s × s, r = t × s ◦— unionsqy(y = s3) unionsq-Choose: 1
3. ∀x(x3 = (x× x)× x), t = s × s, unionsqz(z = t × s) ◦— unionsqy(y = s3) Wait: 2
4. ∀x(x3 = (x× x)× x), t = s × s, yunionsqz(z = t × y) ◦— unionsqy(y = s3) -Choose: 3
5. ∀x(x3 = (x× x)× x), t = s × s, xyunionsqz(z = x× y) ◦— unionsqy(y = s3) -Choose: 4
6. ∀x(x3 = (x× x)× x), unionsqz(z = s × s), xyunionsqz(z = x× y) ◦— unionsqy(y = s3) Wait: 5
7. ∀x(x3 = (x× x)× x), yunionsqz(z = s × y), xyunionsqz(z = x× y) ◦— unionsqy(y = s3) -Choose: 6
8. ∀x(x3 = (x× x)× x), xyunionsqz(z = x× y), xyunionsqz(z = x× y) ◦— unionsqy(y = s3) -Choose: 7
9. ∀x(x3 = (x× x)× x), xyunionsqz(z = x× y) ◦— unionsqy(y = s3) Replicate: 8
10. ∀x(x3 = (x× x)× x), xyunionsqz(z = x× y) ◦— xunionsqy(y = x3) Wait: 9
Example 9.2. The formula ∀xp(x) → xp(x) is provable in CL12. It follows from ∀xp(x) → p(y) by Wait. The latter, in turn,
follows by Wait from the empty set of premises.
On the other hand, the formula xp(x) → ∀xp(x), i.e. unionsqx¬p(x) ∨ ∀xp(x), in not provable. Indeed, its elementarization
is ⊥ ∨ ∀xp(x), which is not classically valid. Hence unionsqx¬p(x) ∨ ∀xp(x) cannot be derived by Wait. Replicate can also be
dismissed for obvious reasons. This leaves us with unionsq-Choose. But if unionsqx¬p(x) ∨ ∀xp(x) is derived by unionsq-Choose, then the
premise should be ¬p(t)∨ ∀xp(x) for some variable or constant t. The latter, however, is a classically non-valid elementary
formula and hence unprovable.
Example 9.3. The formula xunionsqy(p(x) → p(y)) is provable in CL12 as follows:
1. p(s) → p(s) Wait:
2. unionsqy(p(s) → p(y)) unionsq-Choose: 1
3. xunionsqy(p(x) → p(y)) Wait: 2
On the other hand, the formula unionsqyx(p(x) → p(y)) can be seen to be unprovable, even though its classical counterpart
∃y∀x(p(x) → p(y)) is a classically valid elementary formula and hence provable in CL12.
Example 9.4. While the formula ∀x∃y(y = f (x)) is classically valid and hence provable in CL12, its constructive counterpartxunionsqy(y = f (x)) can be easily seen to be unprovable. This is no surprise. In view of the expected soundness of CL12,
provability of xunionsqy(y = f (x)) would imply that every function f is computable, which, of course, is not the case.
Exercise 9.5. To see the resource-consciousness of CL12, show that it does not prove p  q → (p  q)∧ (p  q), even though
this formula has the form F → F ∧ F of a classical tautology. Then show that, in contrast, CL12 proves the sequent p  q ◦—
(pq)∧ (pq) because, unlike the antecedent of a →-combination, the antecedent of a ◦—-combination is reusable (trough
Replicate).
5 An essentially the same logic, under the name L, was in fact known as early as in [12].
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does not prove any of the formulas
unionsqxyp(x, y) → unionsqx(yp(x, y)∧yp(x, y));
unionsqxyp(x, y)∧unionsqxyp(x, y) → unionsqx(yp(x, y)∧yp(x, y));
unionsqxyp(x, y)∧unionsqxyp(x, y)∧unionsqxyp(x, y) → unionsqx(yp(x, y)∧yp(x, y));
· · ·
10. The adequacy of logic CL12
Logical Consequence (LC) is the following rule, with both the premises and the conclusion being formulas:
From E1, . . . , En conclude F , as long as CL12 proves E1, . . . , En ◦— F .
When F follows from E1, . . . , En by this rule, i.e., when CL12  E1, . . . , En ◦— F , we say that F is a logical consequence of
E1, . . . , En .
The oﬃcial terms of the language of CL12, identiﬁed with their parse trees, are tree-style structures, so let us call them
tree-terms. A more general and economical way to represent terms, however, is to allow merging some or all identical-
content nodes in such trees, thus turning them into (directed, acyclic, rooted, edge-ordered multi-) graphs. Let us call these
unoﬃcial sorts of terms graph-terms. The idea of representing linguistic objects in the form of graphs rather than trees is
central in the approach called cirquent calculus [16,23], and has already proven its worth. We once again ﬁnd the usefulness
of that idea in our present, complexity-sensitive context. Fig. 1 illustrates two terms representing the same polynomial
function y8, with the term on the right being a tree-term and the term on the left being a graph-term. As this example
suggests, graph-terms are generally exponentially smaller than the corresponding tree-terms, which explains our interest in
the former. Fig. 1 also makes it unnecessary to formally deﬁne graph-terms, as their meaning must be perfectly clear after
looking at this single example.
By a polynomial graph-term τ we shall mean a graph-term not containing (at its leaves) any constants other than 0,
and not containing (at its internal nodes) any function letters other than ′ (unary), + (binary) and × (binary). The total
number k of the variables y1, . . . , yk occurring in (at the leaves of) τ is said to be the arity of τ . Subsequently we shall
only be interested in unary (1-ary) polynomial graph-terms, and will typically omit the word “unary”. Terminologically and
notationally we shall usually identify such a term τ with the unary polynomial arithmetical function represented by it under
the standard arithmetical interpretation (x′ means x+ 1). So, for instance, either term of Fig. 1 is a polynomial graph-term,
representing — and identiﬁed with — the function y8.
We generalize the above concept of a (unary) polynomial graph-term τ to that of a (1,n)-ary explicit polynomial
functional by allowing the term τ to contain, on top of variables and 0, ′ , +, ×, additional n (n  0) unary function
letters f1, . . . , fn , semantically treated as placeholders for unary arithmetical functions. We say that such a τ depends
on f1, . . . , fn . Replacing f1, . . . , fn by names g1, . . . , gn of some particular unary arithmetical functions turns τ into the
corresponding unary arithmetical function, which we shall denote by τ (g1, . . . , gn). For instance, the term of Fig. 2 is a
(1,2)-ary explicit polynomial functional. Let us denote it by τ . Then, if g means “square” and h means “cube”, τ (g,h) is
the unary arithmetical function (y2 + y3)3.
We further generalize the concept of a (unary) polynomial graph-term τ to that of a (unary) explicit polynomial func-
tion. The latter is deﬁned as a nonempty sequence 〈τ f1 , . . . , τ fk 〉 of explicit polynomial functionals indexed by (associated
with) pairwise distinct unary function letters f1, . . . , fk , where each τ f i does not depend on any function letters that are
not among f1, . . . , f i−1. Note that this condition makes τ f1 simply a polynomial graph-term, i.e., a (1,0)-ary explicit poly-
nomial functional. (Meta)semantically, each index f i here is a name of (represents) a unary arithmetical function, and the
corresponding τ f i is a deﬁnition of that function in terms of 0,
′ , +, × and some earlier-deﬁned functions; then τ itself
is stipulated to represent the same function as fk does. Again, a single example would be suﬃcient to fully clarify the
denotation of each explicit polynomial function. Consider the explicit polynomial function τ = 〈τ f1 , τ f1 , τ f3 〉, where τ f1 and
τ f2 are the (1,0)-ary explicit polynomial functionals of Fig. 1, and τ f3 is the (1,2)-ary explicit polynomial functional of
Fig. 2. Thus, both f1 and f2 represent the same unary polynomial function y8, and f3, i.e. τ itself, represents the unary
polynomial function (y8 + y8)8. Of course, every explicit polynomial function can be translated into an equivalent polyno-
mial graph-term, but such a translation can increase the size exponentially. For our purposes, polynomial graph-terms (let
alone tree-terms) are too ineﬃcient means of representing polynomial functions. This explains our preference for explicit
polynomial functions as a standard way of writing (in our metalanguage) polynomial terms.
As in the case of polynomial graph-terms, terminologically and notationally we shall usually identify an explicit poly-
nomial function τ with the unary arithmetical function represented by it. When τ is an explicit polynomial function and
M is a τ time (resp. space) machine, we say that τ is an explicit polynomial bound for the time (resp. space) complexity
of M.
Another auxiliary concept that we are going to rely on in this section and later is that of a generalized HPM (GHPM).
For a natural number n, an n-ary GHPM is deﬁned in the same way as an HPM, with the difference that the former takes n
1328 G. Japaridze / Information and Computation 209 (2011) 1312–1354Fig. 1. A graph-term and the corresponding tree-term.
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natural numbers as inputs (say, provided on a separate, read-only input tape); such inputs are present at the very beginning
of the work of the machine and remain unchanged throughout it. An ordinary HPM is thus nothing but a 0-ary GHPM.
When M is an n-ary GHPM and c1, . . . , cn are natural numbers, M(c1, . . . , cn) denotes the HPM that works just like M
in the scenario where the latter has received c1, . . . , cn as inputs. We will assume that some reasonable encoding (through
natural numbers) of GHPMs is ﬁxed. When M is a GHPM, M denotes its code.
The paper [29] established the soundness of CL12 in the following strong sense:
Theorem 10.1. (See [29].) If a formula F is a logical consequence of formulas E1, . . . , En and ∗ is an interpretation such that each E∗i
(1 i  n) is computable, then so is F ∗ . Furthermore:
1. There is an eﬃcient6 procedure that takes an arbitrary CL12-proof of an arbitrary sequent E1, . . . , En ◦— F and constructs a n-
ary GHPM M, together with a (1,n)-ary explicit polynomial functional τ , such that, for any interpretation ∗ , any n-ary GHPMs
N1, . . . ,Nn and any unary arithmetical functions g1, . . . , gn, if each Ni(N1, . . . ,Nn) is a gi time solution of E∗i , thenM(N1, . . . ,Nn) is a τ (g1, . . . , gn) time solution of F ∗ .
2. The same holds for “space” instead of “time”.
Among the corollaries of the above theorem is that LC preserves both polynomial time and polynomial space computabil-
ities, as well as Ω-time and Ω-space computabilities for any class Ω of functions containing all polynomial functions and
closed under composition (such as, say, the class of all primitive recursive functions). Indeed, to see that LC preserves (for
instance) polynomial time computability, assume F is a logical consequence of E1, . . . , En , and the HPMs N1, . . . ,Nn are
polynomial time solutions of E1, . . . , En . Of course, every such HPM Ni can as well be seen as an n-ary GHPM which simply
ignores its inputs. So, each Ni(N1, . . . ,Nn) solves Ei . Then, according to Theorem 10.1, we can construct a polynomial
time solution M(N1, . . . ,Nn) of F . Furthermore, such a solution, together with an explicit polynomial bound for its
time complexity, can be eﬃciently extracted from N1, . . . ,Nn , explicit polynomial bounds for their time complexities, and
the CL12-proof of E1, . . . , En ◦— F .
Remember that, philosophically speaking, computational resources are symmetric to computational problems: what is a
problem for one player to solve is a resource that the other player can use. Namely, having a problem A as a computational
resource intuitively means having the ability to successfully solve/win A. For instance, as a resource, xunionsqy(y = x2) means
the ability to tell the square of any number.
Together with soundness, [29] also established the completeness of CL12. While in the present paper we treat ◦— merely
as a syntactic expression separating the two parts of a sequent, in [29] it is seen as an operation on games, called ultimate
reduction. For simplicity considerations, we do not want to reproduce the deﬁnition of ◦— here, which would be necessary
to precisely state the completeness result for CL12. We shall only point out that, intuitively, A1, . . . , An ◦— B is (indeed) the
problem of reducing B to A1, . . . , An in the most general intuitive sense. It is similar to A1 ∧ · · · ∧ An → B , but with the
difference that, during playing this game, in the former  can use any of the antecedental resources Ai repeatedly, while
6 Here and later in similar metacontexts, “eﬃcient” means “polynomial time”.
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sense possible. Namely, it is not necessary to restart Ai from the beginning every time it is reused.  may as well choose
to continue Ai — in a new way — from any of the previously reached positions. This corresponds to the way of reusage
any purely software resource would offer in the presence of an advanced operating system and unlimited memory: one can
start running process Ai , then fork it at any stage thus creating two copies (branches) with a common past but possibly
diverging futures, then fork any of the new branches again at any time, and so on. See [26] or [29] for more details and
explanations.
Anyway, the completeness result of [29] for CL12 says that, if there is an HPM that solves the problem E∗1, . . . , E∗n ◦— F ∗
for any interpretation ∗ — such an ∗-independent HPM is said to be a logical solution of the sequent E1, . . . , En ◦— F —
then CL12  E1, . . . , En ◦— F . Furthermore, the same has been shown to hold even if HPMs are no longer required to follow
algorithmic (let alone eﬃcient) strategies — for instance, if they are allowed to use oracles for whatever functions. This
result, in view of the intuitions captured by the operation ◦—, eventually translates in [29] into the following thesis relevant
to our further purposes:
Thesis 10.2. (See [29].) Assume E1, . . . , En, F are formulas such that there is a ∗-independent (whatever interpretation ∗)
intuitive description and justiﬁcation of a winning strategy for F ∗ , which relies on the availability and “recyclability” — in
the strongest sense possible — of E∗1, . . . , E∗n as computational resources. Then F is a logical consequence of E1, . . . , En .
The above means that the rule of Logical Consequence lives up to its name, and that we can always reliably use intuition
on games and strategies when reasoning about them in CL12-based systems (where LC is a rule of inference) such as CLA4.
Namely, once a formula E is proven in such a system, it can be treated as a recyclable resource whose unlimited availability
can be safely assumed for any new strategies that we construct. More precisely, a new strategy may assume that there is
an (external) provider of the resource E (call it an oracle for E if you prefer), capable of successfully playing E for (against)
us any time and in any number of sessions, whether we choose those sessions to evolve in a parallel or a branched/forked
fashion.
Example 10.3. Imagine a CL12-based applied formal theory, in which we have already proven two facts: ∀x(x3 = (x× x)× x)
(the meaning of “cube” in terms of multiplication) and xyunionsqz(z = x× y) (the computability of multiplication), and now
we want to derive xunionsqy(y = x3) (the computability of “cube”). This is how we can reason to justify xunionsqy(y = x3):
Consider any s (selected by Environment for x in xunionsqy(y = x3)). We need to ﬁnd s3 . Using the resource xyunionsqz(z = x × y)
twice, we ﬁrst ﬁnd the value t of s × s, and then the value r of t × s. According to ∀x(x3 = (x× x)× x), such an r is the sought s3 .
Thesis 10.2 promises that the above intuitive argument will be translatable into a CL12-proof of
∀x(x3 = (x× x)× x), xyunionsqz(z = x× y) ◦— xunionsqy(y = x3)
(and hence the succedent will be derivable in the theory by LC as the formulas of the antecedent are already proven). Such
a proof indeed exists — see Example 9.1.
CL12 — more precisely, the associated rule of LC — is adequate because, on one hand, by Theorem 10.1, it is sound for
a wide spectrum of applied theories, including — but not limited to — polynomial-time-oriented ones, and, on the other
hand, by Thesis 10.2, it is as strong as a logical rule of inference could possibly be.
11. Theory CLA4 introduced
The language of CLA4, whose formulas more speciﬁcally can be referred to as CLA4-formulas, is obtained from the
language of CL12 by removing all nonlogical predicate letters (thus only leaving the logical predicate letter =), removing all
constants but 0, and removing all but three function letters, which are:
• successor, unary. We will write τ ′ for successor(τ ).
• sum, binary. We will write τ1 + τ2 for sum(τ1, τ2).
• product, binary. We will write τ1 × τ2 for product(τ1, τ2).
Thus, the language of CLA4 extends that of Peano arithmetic PA (see, for example, [11]) through adding to it ,unionsq,unionsq,.
Formulas that have no free occurrences of variables are said to be sentences.
The concept of an interpretation explained earlier can now be restricted to interpretations that are only deﬁned on ′ , +
and ×, as the present language has no other nonlogical function or predicate letters. Of such interpretations, the standard
interpretation † is the one whose universe is the ideal universe {0,1,10,11,100, . . .}, with its elements identiﬁed with the
corresponding natural numbers, and which interprets ′ as the standard successor (x+ 1) function, interprets + as the sum
function, and interprets × as the product function. For a CLA4-formula F , the standard interpretation of F is the game F †,
which we typically write simply as F unless doing so may cause ambiguity.
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choice of this notation is related to the fact that, given any natural number a, the binary representation of 0′′ ×a (i.e., of 2a)
is nothing but the binary representation of a with a “0” added on its right. Similarly, the binary representation of (0′′ × a)′
is nothing but the binary representation of a with a “1” added to it. Of course, here an exception is the case a = 0. It can
be made an ordinary case by assuming that adding any number of 0s at the beginning of a binary numeral b results in a
legitimate numeral representing the same number as b does.
The number a0 (i.e. 2a) will be said to be the binary 0-successor of a, and a1 (i.e. 2a + 1) said to be the binary 1-
successor of a; in turn, we can refer to a as the binary predecessor of a0 and a1. As for a′ , we can refer to it as the
unary successor of a, and refer to a as the unary predecessor of a′ . Every number has a binary predecessor, and every
number except 0 has a unary predecessor. Note that the binary predecessor of a number is the result of deleting the last
digit (if present) in its binary representation. Remember that the string 0 for us is just another name of the empty string 
representing the number zero. So, 0 and 1 are no exceptions to the above rule: deleting the last (and only) digit of 1 results
in ; and “deleting the last digit” in 0, i.e. in  , again results in  , as there is no digit to delete.
The language of PA is known to be very expressive, despite its nonlogical vocabulary oﬃcially being limited to only
0, ′ , +, ×. Speciﬁcally, it allows us to express, in a certain standard way, all recursive functions and relations, and beyond.
Relying on the common knowledge of the power of the language of PA, we will be using standard expressions such as x y,
y > x, etc. in formulas as abbreviations of the corresponding proper expressions of the language. In our metalanguage, |x|
will refer to the length of the binary numeral for the number represented by x. In other words, |x| = log2(x + 1) (y
means the smallest integer z with y  z). Expressions like |x| we refer to as pseudoterms — oﬃcially they are not terms
of the object language, but in many contexts still can be treated as such. Another example of a pseudoterm is 2x with
its standard meaning. So, when we write, say, “|x|  y”, it is oﬃcially to be understood as an abbreviation of a standard
formula of PA saying that |x| does not exceed y.
For a variable x, by a polynomial sizebound for x we shall mean a standard formula of the language of PA saying
that |x|  τ (|y1|, . . . , |yn|), where y1, . . . , yn are any variables different from x, and τ (|y1|, . . . , |yn|) is any (0, ′,+,×)-
combination of |y1|, . . . , |yn|. For instance, |x| |y| + |z| is a polynomial sizebound for x, which is a formula of PA saying
that the size of x does not exceed the sum of the sizes of y and z. Now, we say that a CLA4-formula F is polynomially
bounded iff:
• Whenever xG(x) is a subformula of F , G(x) has the form S(x) → H(x), where S(x) is a polynomial sizebound for x.
• Whenever unionsqxG(x) is a subformula of F , G(x) has the form S(x)∧ H(x), where S(x) is a polynomial sizebound for x.
Remember that, where F is a formula, ∀F means the ∀-closure of F , i.e., ∀x1 · · · ∀xn F , where x1, . . . , xn are the free
variables of F . Similarly for ∃F , F , unionsqF .
The axioms of CLA4 are:
Axiom 1: ∀x(0 
= x′)
Axiom 2: ∀x∀y(x′ = y′ → x= y)
Axiom 3: ∀x(x+ 0= x)
Axiom 4: ∀x∀y(x+ y′ = (x+ y)′)
Axiom 5: ∀x(x× 0= 0)
Axiom 6: ∀x∀y(x× y′ = (x× y)+ x)
Axiom 7: ∀(F (0)∧ ∀x(F (x) → F (x′)) → ∀xF (x)) for each elementary formula F (x)
Axiom 8: xunionsqy(y = x′)
Axiom 9: xunionsqy(y = x0)
All of the above are thus nonlogical axioms (CLA4 has no logical axioms). Note that the overall number of axioms is
inﬁnite rather than nine, because Axiom 7 is not a particular sentence but a scheme of sentences. Axioms 1–7 are nothing
but Peano axioms — the nonlogical axioms of PA. CLA4 thus only has two extra-Peano axioms: Axiom 8 and Axiom 9. In
view of the forthcoming soundness theorem for CLA4, Axiom 8 says that the unary successor function is polynomial time
computable, and Axiom 9 says the same about the binary 0-successor function.
As for the rules of inference, CLA4 has a single logical rule, which is our old friend Logical Consequence, and a single
nonlogical rule, which we call CLA4-Induction. The latter is
(F (0)) (F (x) → F (x0)) (F (x) → F (x1))
(F (x)) ,
where F (x) is any polynomially bounded formula.
Here we shall say that (F (0)) is the basis of induction, (F (x) → F (x0)) is the left inductive step, and (F (x) →
F (x1)) is the right inductive step. The variable x has a special status here, and we say that the conclusion follows from the
premises by CLA4-Induction on x. A reader familiar with Buss’s [6] bounded arithmetic will notice a resemblance between
the PIND axiom scheme of the latter and our CLA4-Induction rule, even though the two beasts operate in very different
environments, of course.
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sentence is either an axiom, or follows from some previous sentences by one of the two rules of inference, and where
the last sentence is F . An extended CLA4-proof is deﬁned in the same way, only, with the additional requirement that
each application of LC should come together with an attached CL12-proof of the corresponding sequent. With some ﬁxed,
effective, sound and complete axiomatization L of classical ﬁrst order logic in mind, a superextended CLA4-proof is an
extended CLA4-proof with the additional requirement that every application of Wait in the justiﬁcation of a CL12-derivation
in it comes with an L-proof of the elementarization of the conclusion. Note that the property of being a superextended proof
is (eﬃciently) decidable, while the properties of being an extended proof or just a proof are only recursively enumerable.
We write CLA4  F to say that F is provable (has a proof) in CLA4, and CLA4 
 F to say the opposite.
Generally, as in the above deﬁnition of provability and proofs, in CLA4 we will only be interested in proving sentences.7
So, for technical convenience, we agree that, from now on, whenever we write CLA4  F (or say “F is provable”) for a non-
sentence F , it simply means that CLA4  F . Similarly, when we say that a given strategy solves F , it is to be understood
as that the strategy solves F . Similarly, when we say that F is a logical consequence of E1, . . . , En , what we typically
mean is that F is a logical consequence of E1, . . . ,En . To summarize, in the context of CLA4, any formula with free
variables should be understood as its -closure. An exception is when F (x1, . . . , xn) is an elementary formula and we say
that F (c1, . . . , cn) is true (whatever constants c1, . . . , cn). This is to be understood as that the ∀-closure ∀F (c1, . . . , cn) of
F (c1, . . . , cn) is true (in the standard model), for “truth” is only meaningful for elementary formulas (which F generally
would not be). An important fact on which we will often rely yet only implicitly so, is that the sentence ∀F → F or the
closed sequent ∀F ◦— F is (always) CL12-provable. In view of the soundness of CL12, this means that whenever (F is
elementary and) ∀F is true, F is automatically won by a strategy that does nothing.
Example 11.1. The following sequence is a proof of xunionsqy(y = x1), i.e. of xunionsqy(y = (x0)′) — the sentence saying that the
binary 1-successor function is computable:
I. xunionsqy(y = x′) Axiom 8
II. xunionsqy(y = x0) Axiom 9
III. xunionsqy(y = (x0)′) LC: I, II
An extended version of the above proof would have to include a justiﬁcation for step III where LC was used, such as the
following one:
1. t = r′, r = s0 ◦— t = (s0)′ Wait:
2. t = r′, r = s0 ◦— unionsqy(y = (s0)′) unionsq-Choose: 1
3. unionsqy(y = r′), r = s0 ◦— unionsqy(y = (s0)′) Wait: 2
4. xunionsqy(y = x′), r = s0 ◦— unionsqy(y = (s0)′) -Choose: 3
5. xunionsqy(y = x′), unionsqy(y = s0) ◦— unionsqy(y = (s0)′) Wait: 4
6. xunionsqy(y = x′), xunionsqy(y = x0) ◦— unionsqy(y = (s0)′) -Choose: 5
7. xunionsqy(y = x′), xunionsqy(y = x0) ◦— xunionsqy(y = (x0)′) Wait:
As we just saw, (additionally) justifying an application of LC takes more space than the (non-extended) proof itself. And
this would be a typical case for CLA4-proofs. Luckily, however, there is no real need to formally justify LC. Firstly, this is so
because CL12 is an analytic system, and proof-search in it is a routine (even if sometimes long) syntactic exercise. Secondly,
in view of Thesis 10.2, there is no need to generate formal CL12-proofs anyway: instead, we can use intuition on games and
strategies. In the present case, the whole (III+7)-step extended formal proof can be replaced by a short intuitive argument
in the following style:
Consider any s chosen by Environment for x. We need to compute (s0)′ . Using Axiom 9, we ﬁnd the value r of s0. Then, using
Axiom 8, we ﬁnd the value t of r′ . Such a t is what we are looking for.
Furthermore, as we agreed to understand a proof of a non-sentence F as a proof of its -closure F , the above argument
can be shortened by considering simply unionsqy(y = x1) instead of xunionsqy(y = x1). This would allow us to skip the phrase
“Consider any s chosen by Environment for x” and the necessity to introduce the new name/variable s. Instead, we can
simply say “Consider any x”, implicitly letting x itself serve as a variable for the value chosen by Environment for x when
playing the -closure of the game. Sometimes we can go even lazier and skip the phrase “Consider any x” altogether.
In view of the following fact, an alternative way to present CLA4 would be to delete Axioms 1–7 and, instead, declare all
(closed) theorems of PA to be axioms of CLA4 along with Axioms 8 and 9:
7 In case we do not insist that every formula in an CLA4-proof be a sentence, one could show that, if F is not a sentence, it is provable (in this relaxed
sense) if and only if its -closure is so, anyway.
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Proof. Suppose (the classical-logic-based) PA proves F . By the deduction theorem for classical logic this means that, for
some nonlogical axioms H1, . . . , Hn of PA, the formula H1 ∧ · · · ∧ Hn → F is provable in classical ﬁrst order logic. Hence
H1 ∧ · · · ∧ Hn ◦— F is provable in CL12 by Wait from the empty set of premises. Hence F is a logical consequence of the
Peano axioms H1, . . . , Hn of CLA4 and, as such, is provable by LC. 
The above fact, on which we will be implicitly relying in the sequel, allows us to construct “lazy” CLA4-proofs where
some steps can be justiﬁed by simply indicating their provability in PA. That is, we will treat theorems of PA as if they
were axioms of CLA4. As PA is well known and well studied, we safely assume that the reader has a good feel for what
it can prove, so we do not usually further justify PA-provability claims that we make. A reader less familiar with PA, can
take it as a rule of thumb that, despite Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, PA proves every true number-theoretic fact that a
contemporary high school student can establish, or that mankind was or could be aware of before 1931.
Example 11.3. The following sequence is a lazy proof of x(x= 0unionsqx 
= 0) — the formula saying that the “zeroness” predicate
is decidable:
I. 0= 0 unionsq 0 
= 0 LC:
II. ∀x(x= 0→ x0= 0) PA
III. ∀x(x 
= 0→ x0 
= 0) PA
IV. x(x= 0 unionsq x 
= 0→ x0= 0 unionsq x0 
= 0) LC: II, III
V. ∀x(x1 
= 0) PA
VI. x(x= 0 unionsq x 
= 0→ x1= 0 unionsq x1 
= 0) LC: V
VII. x(x= 0 unionsq x 
= 0) CLA4-Induction: I, IV, VI.
An extended version of the above proof will include the following three additional justiﬁcations (CL12-proofs):
A justiﬁcation for Step I:
1. 0= 0 Wait:
2. 0= 0 unionsq 0 
= 0 unionsq-Choose: 1
A justiﬁcation for Step IV:
1. ∀x(x= 0→ x0= 0), ∀x(x 
= 0→ x0 
= 0) ◦— s = 0→ s0= 0 Wait:
2. ∀x(x= 0→ x0= 0), ∀x(x 
= 0→ x0 
= 0) ◦— s = 0→ s0= 0 unionsq s0 
= 0 unionsq-Choose: 1
3. ∀x(x= 0→ x0= 0), ∀x(x 
= 0→ x0 
= 0) ◦— s 
= 0→ s0 
= 0 Wait:
4. ∀x(x= 0→ x0= 0), ∀x(x 
= 0→ x0 
= 0) ◦— s 
= 0→ s0= 0 unionsq s0 
= 0 unionsq-Choose: 3
5. ∀x(x= 0→ x0= 0), ∀x(x 
= 0→ x0 
= 0) ◦— s = 0 unionsq s 
= 0→ s0= 0 unionsq s0 
= 0 Wait: 2, 4
6. ∀x(x= 0→ x0= 0), ∀x(x 
= 0→ x0 
= 0) ◦— x(x= 0 unionsq s 
= 0→ x0= 0 unionsq x0 
= 0) Wait: 5
A justiﬁcation for Step VI:
1. ∀x(x1 
= 0) ◦— s = 0→ s1 
= 0 Wait:
2. ∀x(x1 
= 0) ◦— s 
= 0→ s1 
= 0 Wait:
3. ∀x(x1 
= 0) ◦— s = 0 unionsq s 
= 0→ s1 
= 0 Wait: 1, 2
4. ∀x(x1 
= 0) ◦— s = 0 unionsq s 
= 0→ s1= 0 unionsq s1 
= 0 unionsq-Choose: 3
5. ∀x(x1 
= 0) ◦— x(x= 0 unionsq x 
= 0→ x1= 0 unionsq x1 
= 0) Wait: 4
But, again, in the sequel we will not generate formal (even if lazy) proofs in the above style but, instead, limit ourselves
to informal arguments within CLA4. Below we illustrate such an argument for the present case. Further, as explained in the
previous example, we prefer to deal with x = 0 unionsq x 
= 0 rather than x(x = 0 unionsq x 
= 0), and do not explicitly say “consider
any value x chosen for the variable x by Environment”.
We prove x= 0 unionsq x 
= 0 by CL12-Induction on x.
The Basis 0= 0 unionsq 0 
= 0 of induction is straightforward: it is solved by choosing the left unionsq-disjunct.
Solving the left inductive step x= 0unionsq x 
= 0→ x0= 0unionsq x0 
= 0means solving the consequent using a single copy of the antecedent
as a resource. From PA, we know that x0= 0 iff x= 0. And whether x = 0 or not we can ﬁnd out using the resource x = 0 unionsq x 
= 0. So,
we can tell whether x0= 0 or (unionsq) x0 
= 0, as desired.
The right inductive step x= 0unionsq x 
= 0→ x1= 0unionsq x1 
= 0 is solved by simply choosing the right unionsq-disjunct in the consequent which,
by PA, is true.
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advance, our reliance on some basic nonelementary facts such as the just-proven x(x= 0unionsq x 
= 0) may increasingly become
only implicit.
Why did not we use the following, much simpler intuitive argument instead of the above one?
To solve x = 0 unionsq x 
= 0, see if x (the constant chosen by Environment for x) is 0 or not. If yes, choose the left unionsq-disjunct; otherwise
choose the right unionsq-disjunct.
The above argument is not valid, in the sense that it is not “purely logical”, and hence Thesis 10.2 does not guarantee
that it will be translatable into a formal proof. Namely, in being conﬁdent that the above strategy wins the game, we rely
on the extra-logical knowledge of the fact that different constants are names of different objects. This is indeed so for the
standard model of arithmetic. But in some other models it is quite possible that, say, both constants 0 and 10 are names
for the same object of the universe. Then, the above strategy prescribes to choose the false 10 
= 0 in the corresponding
scenario.
Thus, x(x = 0 unionsq x 
= 0), while provable in CLA4, is not logically valid, that is, is not provable in CL12. The same applies
to the more general principle xy(x= y unionsq x 
= y), whose CLA4-provability is shown later in Section 12.
When a formula F (x1, . . . , xn) is a standard (in whatever informal sense) representation of an n-ary predicate p and
CLA4  (F (x1, . . . , xn) unionsq ¬F (x1, . . . , xn)), we say that p is CLA4-provably decidable. Similarly, when F (y, x1, . . . , xn) is a
standard representation of the graph of an n-ary function f and CLA4  unionsqyF (y, x1, . . . , xn), we say that f is CLA4-
provably computable. Since CLA4 is the only system of clarithmetic dealt with in this paper, the preﬁx “CLA4” before “prov-
ably” can be safely omitted. So, for instance, Example 11.3 established the provable decidability of the “zeroness” predicate,
and Example 11.1 established the provable computability of the binary 1-successor function. The same terminology extends
to partially deﬁned functions as well. For instance, the later-proven Fact 12.3 shows that CLA4  x(x 
= 0 → unionsqy(x = y′)).
We understand this as the provable computability of the (partial) unary predecessor function.
Exercise 11.4. Let Even(x) be an abbreviation of ∃z(x = z + z), and Odd(x) be an abbreviation of ¬Even(x). Find a lazy
CLA4-proof of
∀x(Even(x) unionsq Odd(x) →y(Even(x+ y) unionsq Odd(x+ y))).
Hint: Relying on the PA-provable fact that x0 is always even and x1 is always odd, by CLA4-Induction prove x(Even(x) unionsq
Odd(x)). The target sentence is a logical consequence of the latter and the PA-provable fact that the sum of two numbers is
even iff both numbers are even or both are odd.
By an arithmetical problem in this paper we mean a game A such that, for some sentence F of the language of CLA4,
A = F † (remember that † is the standard interpretation). Such a sentence F is said a representation of A. We say that an
arithmetical problem A is provable in CLA4 iff it has a CLA4-provable representation. In these terms, a central result of the
present paper sounds as follows:
Theorem 11.5. An arithmetical problem has a polynomial time solution iff it is provable in CLA4.
Furthermore, there is an eﬃcient procedure that takes an arbitrary extended CLA4-proof of an arbitrary sentence X and constructs
a solution of X (of X† , that is) together with an explicit polynomial bound for its time complexity.
Proof. The soundness (“if”) part of this theorem will be proven in Section 13, and the completeness (“only if”) part in
Section 14. 
12. Some more taste of CLA4
In this section we establish several CLA4-provability facts. In view of the soundness of CLA4, each such fact tells us about
the eﬃcient solvability of the associated number-theoretic computational problem.
As mentioned, the present work has been written not merely as a research paper but also as an advanced tutorial on
CoL-based applied theories. The series of proofs given in this section can be treated as exercises aimed at developing the
reader’s feel for CoL-based systems and CLA4 in particular. But these proofs also provide certain necessary results relied
upon later, in our proof of the extensional completeness of CLA4.
As noted earlier, we shall exclusively rely on informal reasoning in CLA4, remembering that behind every such piece of
reasoning is a formal CLA4-proof.
Fact 12.1. CLA4  unionsqy(y = |x|) (i.e., CLA4  xunionsqy(y = |x|)).
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The basis unionsqy(|y| |0| ∧ y = |0|) is solved by selecting 0 for y. Such a move brings the game down to |0| 0∧ 0 = |0|.
From PA, we know that the latter is true. So, we win.
The left inductive step is unionsqy(|y| |x| ∧ y = |x|) → unionsqy(|y| |x0| ∧ y = |x0|). Using Example 11.3, we ﬁgure our whether
x = 0 or not. If x = 0, then (we know from PA that) |x0| = 0, so we win the game by selecting 0 for y in the consequent.
Now suppose x 
= 0. We wait till Environment selects a constant a for y in the antecedent8 (if this does not happen, we
win). Then, using Axiom 8, we compute the value (constant) b with b = a′ , and choose b for y in the consequent. We
win because, from PA, we know that when x is not 0, the resulting position |a|  |x| ∧ a = |x| → |b|  |x0| ∧ b = |x0|, i.e.
|a| |x| ∧ a = |x| → |a′| |x0| ∧ a′ = |x0| (whatever the value of x is) is true. The right inductive step is similar but simpler,
as we do not need to separately consider the case of x= 0.
So, we know how to win (the -closure of) unionsqy(|y| |x| ∧ y = |x|). But then, of course, ignoring the |y| |x| conjunct,
we also know how to win (the -closure of the weaker) unionsqy(y = |x|). Putting it in precise terms, xunionsqy(y = |x|) is an
(easy) logical consequence of xunionsqy(|y| |x| ∧ y = |x|) — that is, the sequent xunionsqy(|y| |x| ∧ y = |x|) ◦—xunionsqy(y = |x|)
is (easily) provable in CL12. 
Compare the -closures of the following formulas:
∃y(x = y0∨ x= y1) (5)
unionsqy(x= y0∨ x= y1) (6)
∃y(x = y0 unionsq x = y1) (7)
unionsqy(x= y0 unionsq x= y1) (8)
All four sentences “say the same” about the arbitrary () number represented by x, but in different ways. (5) is the weakest,
least informative, of the four. It says that x has a binary predecessor y, and that x is even (i.e., is the binary 0-successor
of its binary predecessor) or odd (i.e., is the binary 1-successor of its binary predecessor). This is an almost trivial piece
of information. (6) and (7) carry stronger information. According to (6), x not just merely has a binary predecessor y, but
such a predecessor can be actually and eﬃciently found. (7) strengthens (5) in another way. It says that x can be eﬃciently
determined to be even or odd. As for (8), it is the strongest. It carries two pieces of good news at once: we can eﬃciently
ﬁnd the binary predecessor y of x and, simultaneously, tell whether x is even or odd. According to the following fact, (8) is
provable. As we may guess, so are the weaker (7), (6), (5).
Fact 12.2. CLA4  unionsqy(x= y0 unionsq x= y1).
Proof. Argue in CLA4. By CLA4-Induction on x, we ﬁrst want to prove unionsqy(|y| |x| ∧ (x= y0 unionsq x= y1)).
The basis unionsqy(|y| |0|∧ (0= y0unionsq0= y1)) is obviously solved by selecting 0 for y and then choosing the left unionsq-disjunct,
which results in the true (according to PA) sentence |0| |0| ∧ 0= 00. The left inductive step
unionsqy(x= y0 unionsq x= y1) →unionsqy(x0= y0 unionsq x0= y1)
is solved by selecting for y the same constant as the one selected by Environment for x, and then choosing the left unionsq-
disjunct. Similarly, the right inductive step
unionsqy(x= y0 unionsq x= y1) →unionsqy(x1= y0 unionsq x1= y1)
is solved by selecting for y the same constant as the one selected by Environment for x, and then choosing the right
unionsq-disjunct.
Now, unionsqy(x= y0 unionsq x= y1) is a straightforward logical consequence of unionsqy(|y| |x| ∧ (x= y0 unionsq x= y1)). 
The preceding fact established the provable computability of binary predecessor. The following fact does the same for
unary predecessor:
Fact 12.3. CLA4  x 
= 0→ unionsqy(x= y′).
Proof. Argue in CLA4. By CLA4-Induction on x, we want to prove x 
= 0 → unionsqy(|y|  |x| ∧ x = y′), from which the target
x 
= 0→ unionsqy(x= y′) follows immediately by LC.
8 In informal arguments like this, we usually do not try to be consistent in using different metavariables for constants and variables. Notice that the
status of x in the present informal argument is also “constant” (chosen by Environment for the variable x) just like the status of a but we, out of reluctance
to introduce new names, continue using the expression “x” for it, even though in earlier sections we tried to reserve the metanames x, y, z, . . . (as opposed
to a,b, c, . . .) for variables rather than constants.
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= 0→ unionsqy(|y| |0| ∧ 0= y′) is solved trivially by a strategy that does nothing. A win is guaranteed because
the antecedent is false.
The left inductive step is
(
x 
= 0→unionsqy(|y| |x| ∧ x= y′)) → (x0 
= 0→unionsqy(|y| |x0| ∧ x0= y′)).
If x0 
= 0 (and if not, we win the game), then — according to PA — x 
= 0. So, Environment will have to choose a constant
a for y in the antecedent, or else it loses. We may assume that a is (indeed) the unary predecessor of x, or else, again,
having chosen a wrong a, Environment loses. We know from PA that then the unary predecessor b of x0 equals a1, and that
|b| |x0|. This b can be computed using (the resource provided by) Example 11.1. We choose b for y in the consequent and
win.
The right inductive step
(
x 
= 0→unionsqy(|y| |x| ∧ x= y′)) → (x1 
= 0→unionsqy(|y| |x1| ∧ x1= y′))
is even easier to handle. Prom PA, the unary predecessor of x1 is x0, and |x0| |x1|. Using Axiom 9, we compute the value
b of x0 and choose b for y in the consequent. 
Fact 12.4. CLA4  unionsqz(z = x+ y).
Proof. Argue in CLA4. By CLA4-Induction on x, we want to prove
y(|y| |t| →unionsqz(|z| |x| + |y| ∧ z = x+ y)),
from which, together with the PA-provable fact ∀y(|y| |y|), the target unionsqz(z = x+ y) follows by LC.
The basis is y(|y| |t| → unionsqz(|z| |0| + |y| ∧ z = 0 + y)), which (as always) we prefer to simply write as |y| |t| →unionsqz(|z| |0| + |y| ∧ z = 0 + y). It is won by selecting (the value of) y for z, because we know, from PA, that the resulting
|y| |t| → |y| |0| + |y| ∧ y = 0+ y) is true.
In inductive steps, we will rely on the fact that PA proves (the ∀-closures of) the following formulas:
s0+ r0= (s + r)0, i.e., 2s + 2r = 2(s + r); (9)
s0+ r1= (s + r)1, i.e., 2s + (2r + 1) = 2(s + r)+ 1; (10)
s1+ r0= (s + r)1, i.e., (2s + 1)+ 2r = 2(s + r)+ 1; (11)
s1+ r1= ((s + r)1)′, i.e., (2s + 1)+ (2r + 1) = (2(s + r)+ 1)+ 1. (12)
The left inductive step is
y(|y| |t| →unionsqz(|z| |x| + |y| ∧ z = x+ y)) →y(|y| |t| →unionsqz(|z| |x0| + |y| ∧ z = x0+ y)). (13)
To solve it, we wait till Environment chooses a constant a for y in the consequent, after which (13) will be brought down
to
y(|y| |t| →unionsqz(|z| |x| + |y| ∧ z = x+ y)) → (|a| |t| →unionsqz(|z| |x0| + |a| ∧ z = x0+ a)). (14)
Using Fact 12.2, we ﬁnd the binary predecessor b of a, for which we will also know whether a = b0 or (“or” in the strong
sense of unionsq) a = b1. We specify y as b in the antecedent of (14), and wait till Environment selects a value c for z there.
If a = b0, the game by now will be brought down to
(|b| |t| → (|c| |x| + |b| ∧ c = x+ b)) → (|b0| |t| →unionsqz(|z| |x0| + |b0| ∧ z = x0+ b0)).
Using Axiom 9, we compute the value d of c0, and specify z as d in the consequent. The resulting position
(|b| |t| → (|c| |x| + |b| ∧ c = x+ b)) → (|b0| |t| → |c0| |x0| + |b0| ∧ c0= x0+ b0),
in view of (9) (and certain additional, straightforward PA-provable facts), is true, so we win.
Quite similarly, if a = b1, the game by now will be brought down to
(|b| |t| → (|c| |x| + |b| ∧ c = x+ b)) → (|b1| |t| →unionsqz(|z| |x0| + |b1| ∧ z = x0+ b1)).
Using Example 11.1, we compute the value d of c1, and specify z as d in the consequent. The resulting position
(|b| |t| → (|c| |x| + |b| ∧ c = x+ b)) → (|b1| |t| → |c1| |x0| + |b1| ∧ c1= x0+ b1),
in view of (10), is true, so we win.
The right inductive step will be handled in a similar way, only relying on (11) and (12) instead of (9) and (10). 
Fact 12.5. CLA4  unionsqz(z = x× y).
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as an exercise to the reader. Here we shall only point out that, the four basic PA-provable facts that play the same role here
as facts (9)–(12) in the proof of Fact 12.4 are the following:
s0× r0= (s × r)00, i.e., 2s × 2r = 4(s × r);
s0× r1= (s × r)00+ s0, i.e., 2s × (2r + 1) = 4(s × r)+ 2s;
s1× r0= (s × r)00+ r0, i.e., (2s + 1)× 2r = 4(s × r)+ 2r;
s1× r1= (s × r)00+ (s + r)1, i.e., (2s + 1)× (2r + 1) = 4(s × r)+ 2(s + r)+ 1.
Also, where the previous proof relied on Axiom 9 and Example 11.1, the present proof, in addition, will rely on Fact 12.4. 
The following fact establishes the provable computability of all (polynomial) functions represented through terms:
Fact 12.6. For any term τ (not containing z), CLA4  unionsqz(z = τ ).
Proof. We prove this fact by (meta)induction on the complexity of τ . The base cases are those of τ being the constant 0
or a variable x. Both of the corresponding sentences unionsqz(z = 0) and xunionsqz(z = x) are provable in CL12 and hence also in
CLA4. Next, assume τ is θ ′ . By the induction hypothesis, CLA4 proves unionsqz(z = θ). CLA4 also proves unionsqy(y = x′) (Axiom 8).
The desired unionsqz(z = θ ′) is a logical consequence of these two. The remaining cases of τ being θ1 + θ2 or θ1 × θ2 are handled
in a similar way, relying on Facts 12.4 and 12.5, respectively. 
The formula of the following fact, as a computational problem, is about ﬁnding the (nonnegative) difference z between
any two numbers x and y and then telling whether this difference is x− y or y − x.
Fact 12.7. CLA4  unionsqz(x= y + z unionsq y = x+ z).
Proof. Argue in CLA4. By CLA4-Induction on x, we want to show
y(|y| |t| →unionsqz(|z| |x| + |y| ∧ (x= y + z unionsq y = x+ z))). (15)
The basis |y| |t| → unionsqz(|z|  |0| + |y| ∧ (0 = y + z unionsq y = 0 + z)) is obviously9 solved by the strategy that chooses the
value of y for the variable z and then selects the right unionsq-disjunct.
To solve the left inductive step
y(|y| |t| →unionsqz(|z| |x| + |y| ∧ (x= y + z unionsq y = x+ z)))
→y(|y| |t| →unionsqz(|z| |x0| + |y| ∧ (x0= y + z unionsq y = x0+ z))), (16)
we wait till Environment speciﬁes a constant a for y in the consequent. Then, using Fact 12.2, we compute the binary
predecessor b of a, and also ﬁgure out whether a = b0 or (unionsq) a = b1.
Case 1: a = b0. We specify y as b in the antecedent of (16), this way forcing Environment to choose a constant c for
z there (unless |b|  |t| is false, in which case |a|  |t| is also false and we win), and also choose one of the disjuncts of
x= b + c unionsq b = x+ c. Using Axiom 9, we calculate the value d of c0, and specify z as d in the consequent of (16). Further, if
Environment has chosen x = b + c in the antecedent, we choose the left unionsq-disjunct in the consequent. This means that, by
now, (16) is brought down to
(|b| |t| → |c| |x| + |b| ∧ x= b + c) → (|b0| t → |c0| |x0| + |b0| ∧ x0= b0+ c0).
From PA, the above is true, so we win. Similarly, if Environment has chosen b = x + c in the antecedent of (16), then we
choose the right unionsq-disjunct in the consequent, and again win.
Case 2: a = b1. Again, we specify y as b in the antecedent of (16), this way forcing Environment to choose a constant c
for z there, and also to choose one of the disjuncts of x= b + c unionsq b = x+ c.
Subcase 2.1: b = x+ c is chosen. Using Example 11.1, we calculate the value d of c1, specify z as d in the consequent of
(16), and choose the right unionsq-disjunct there. By now, (16) is brought down to
(|b| |t| → |c| |x| + |b| ∧ b = x+ c) → (|b1| |t| → |c1| |x0| + |b1| ∧ b1= x0+ c1).
According to PA, the above is true, so we win.
Subcase 2.2: x= b + c is chosen. First, using Example 11.3, we ﬁgure our whether c = 0 or (unionsq) c 
= 0.
9 Here and often elsewhere implicitly relying on PA.
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choose the right unionsq-disjunct there. This means that, by now, (16) is brought down to
(|b| |t| → |0| |x| + |b| ∧ x= b + 0) → (|b1| |t| → ∣∣0′∣∣ |x0| + |b1| ∧ b1= x0+ 0′)
which, by PA, is true, so we win.
Subsubcase 2.2.2: c 
= 0. Using Axiom 9 and Fact 12.3, we calculate d with c0 = d′ , i.e. d = c0 − 1, specify z as d in the
consequent of (16), and choose the left unionsq-disjunct there. This means that, by now, (16) is brought down to the following
true (by PA) position, so we win:
(|b| |t| → |c| |x| + |b| ∧ x= b + c) → (|b1| |t| → |c0− 1| |x0| + |b1| ∧ x0= b1+ (c0− 1)).
The right inductive step is handled in a rather similar way, and it is left as an exercise.
Thus, we have proven (15). Now, the target sentence xyunionsqz(x = y + z unionsq y = x+ z)) can be easily seen to be a logical
consequence of (15) and the PA-provable fact ∀y(|y| |y|). 
Fact 12.8. CLA4  x= y unionsq x 
= y.
Proof. Argue in CLA4. In order to solve x = y unionsq x 
= y, using Fact 12.7, we ﬁnd the difference a between x and y. Further,
using Example 11.3, we ﬁgure out whether a = 0 or a 
= 0. If a = 0, we choose the left unionsq-disjunct, otherwise we choose the
right unionsq-disjunct. 
For natural numbers n and i — as always identiﬁed with the corresponding binary numerals — such that i < |n|, in our
metalanguage, we let [n]i mean bit #i of n, where the count of the bits of n starts from 0 rather than 1, and proceeds from
left to right. So, for instance, if n = 100, then 1 is its bit #0, and the 0s are its bits #1 and #2. We treat [n]i as a pseudoterm
just like |x|, meaning that we can feel free to write expressions such as [x]y = z, understood as abbreviations, in formulas
of CLA4.
Fact 12.9. CLA4  y < |x| → unionsqz(z = [x]y).
Proof. Argue in CLA4. By induction on x, we want to show
y(|y| |x| → (y < |x| →unionsqz(|z| 0′ ∧ z = [x]y))). (17)
The basis |y| |0| → (y < |0| → unionsqz(|z| 0′ ∧ z = [0]y)) is obviously solved by a strategy that makes no moves.
To solve the left inductive step
y(|y| |x| → (y < |x| →unionsqz(|z| 0′ ∧ z = [x]y))) →y(|y| |x0| → (y < |x0| →unionsqz(|z| 0′ ∧ z = [x0]y))),
we wait till Environment selects a value a for y in the consequent. Using Facts 12.1 and 12.8, we ﬁgure out whether a = |x|
or not. If yes, we select 0 for z in the consequent. If not, we choose a for y in the antecedent and wait till Environment
responds by selecting a constant b for z there, after which we choose the same constant b for z in the consequent. With a
little thought, this strategy can be seen to win.
The right inductive step has a similar strategy, with the difference that, if a = |x|, it chooses the value of 0′ (found using
Axiom 8) for z in the consequent.
Now, the target y < |x| → unionsqz(z = [x]y) can be seen to be a logical consequence of (17) and the PA-provable fact ∀(y <
|x| → |y| |x|). 
The exponentiation function 2x increases the size of its argument exponentially and hence, in view of the soundness
of CLA4, cannot be provably computable. According to the following fact, however, the same is not the case for a limited
version of the function:
Fact 12.10. CLA4 proves both of the following:
x |z| →unionsqy(y = 2x); (18)
unionsqy(y = 2|r|). (19)
Proof. Argue in CLA4. By CLA4-induction on x, we want to prove x  |z| → unionsqy(|y|  |z|′ ∧ y = 2x), from which (18)
immediately follows by LC.
The basis 0  |z| → unionsqy(|y|  |z|′ ∧ y = 20) is obviously solved by choosing the value a of 0′ for y. Such an a can be
found using Axiom 8. The left inductive step is
(
x |z| →unionsqy(|y| |z|′ ∧ y = 2x)) → (x0 |z| →unionsqy(|y| |z|′ ∧ y = 2x0)).
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loses unless x |z| is false. But, if x |z| is false, then so is x0 |z|, and we win. So, assume a is the constant chosen by
Environment in the antecedent for y. Using Fact 12.5, we compute b with b = a2, and choose b for y in the consequent. We
win because the game will have evolved to (x |z| → |a| |z|′ ∧ a = 2x) → (x0 |z| → |b| |z|′ ∧ b = 2x0), i.e.
(
x |z| → |a| |z|′ ∧ a = 2x) → (2x |z| → ∣∣a2∣∣ |z|′ ∧ a2 = 22x)
which, by PA, is true. The right inductive step is similar, with the difference that here we shall choose b to be 2a2 rather
than a2, computing which will take Axiom 9 in addition to Fact 12.5.
Thus, (18) is proven. Now we solve (19), i.e. unionsqy(y = 2|r|), as follows. First, using Fact 12.1, we ﬁnd the value a of |r|.
Next, using (18) — namely, specifying its z and x as r and a, respectively — we compute the value b with b = 2a , i.e. b = 2|r| ,
and choose that b for y in unionsqy(y = 2|r|). 
We generalize the earlier notation [x]y to [x]zy , additionally to y < |x| requiring that y + z  |x|. It means “the substring
of x of length z which starts at the yth bit”. For instance, if x= 111010, then [x]32 = 101, [x]60 = x and, for each i ∈ {0, . . . ,5},
[x]0i = 0. As always, we identify the bit string [x]zy with the number it represents in the binary notation. Note that the old[x]y is the special case of [x]zy with z = 1. The following fact states the provable computability of the function [x]zy .
Fact 12.11. CLA4  y < |x| ∧ y + z |x| → unionsqt(t = [x]zy).
Proof. Argue in CLA4. First, by CLA4-induction on r, we want to prove
y < |x| ∧ y + |r| |x| →unionsqt(|t| |x| ∧ t = [x]|r|y ). (20)
The basis y < |x| ∧ y+ |0| |x| → unionsqt(|t| |x| ∧ t = [x]|0|y ) is solved straightforwardly by choosing 0 for t . That is because
0 stands for the empty bit string, and so does [x]|0|y for whatever x, y with y < |x|.
The right inductive step is
(
y < |x| ∧ y + |r| |x| →unionsqt(|t| |x| ∧ t = [x]|r|y ))
→ (y < |x| ∧ y + |r1| |x| →unionsqt(|t| |x| ∧ t = [x]|r1|y )). (21)
Assume y < |x| ∧ y + |r1|  |x|. Then we also have y < |x| ∧ y + |r|  |x|. Using the antecedental resource unionsqt(|t|  |x|
∧ t = [x]|r|y ), we ﬁnd a with |a| |x| such that a = [x]|r|y . Using Facts 12.1, 12.4 and 12.9, we further ﬁnd b with b = [x]y+|r| .
Now the sought value of t is the value of a0+ b, which we compute using Axiom 9 and Fact 12.4.
To solve the left inductive step, ﬁrst we ﬁgure out (using Example 11.3) whether r = 0 or not. If r = 0, we ignore the
antecedent and act in the consequent as the strategy for the basis of induction did. Otherwise, we act as the strategy for
the right inductive step did.
(20) is thus proven. To solve the target y < |x| ∧ y + z  |x| → unionsqt(t = [x]zy), assume y < |x| ∧ y + z  |x|. Then z  |x|.
Using Facts 12.2 and 12.10, we ﬁnd the value a of the binary predecessor of 2z . Note that |a| = z. Now, using (20), we ﬁnd
the value b of [x]|a|y , i.e. of [x]zy . Selecting b for t solves the problem. 
13. The soundness of CLA4
This section is devoted to proving the soundness part of Theorem 11.5. It means showing that any CLA4-provable sen-
tence X (as always, identiﬁed with its standard interpretation X†) has a polynomial time solution, and that, furthermore,
such a solution for X , together with an explicit polynomial bound τ for its time complexity, can be eﬃciently extracted
from any extended CLA4-proof of X . Consider any sentence X with a ﬁxed CLA4-proof.
For presentational considerations, by induction on the length of the proof of X , we will ﬁrst simply show that a polyno-
mial time solution of X exists. Only after that, at the end of this section, we will show that such a solution, together with
an explicit polynomial bound for its time complexity, is or can be constructed eﬃciently.
Assume X is an axiom of CLA4. If X is a Peano axiom, then it is a true elementary sentence and therefore is won by a
machine that makes no moves. If X is xunionsqy(y = x′) (Axiom 8), then it is won by a machine that (for the constant x chosen
by Environment for the variable x) computes the value a of x+ 1, and makes a as its only move in the play. Similarly, if X
is xunionsqy(y = x0) (Axiom 9), it is won by a machine that computes the value a of 2x, and makes a as its only move in the
play. Needless to point out that all of the above machines run in polynomial time.
Next, suppose X is obtained from premises Y1, . . . , Yn by LC. By the induction hypothesis, for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, we
already have a solution (HPM) Ni of Yi together with an explicit polynomial bound ξi for the time complexity of Ni . Of
course, every such HPM Ni can as well be seen as an n-ary GHPM that simply ignores its inputs. Then, by Theorem 10.1,
we can (eﬃciently) construct an n-ary GHPM M, together with an explicit polynomial bound τ (ξ1, . . . , ξn) for the time
complexity of the HPM M(N1, . . . ,Nn) such that the latter solves X .
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Induction on x. So, the premises are (the -closures of) F (0), F (x) → F (x0) and F (x) → F (x1). By the induction hypothesis,
there are HPMs N , K0,K1 — with explicit polynomial bounds ξ, ζ0, ζ1 for their time complexities, respectively — that solve
these three premises, respectively. Fix them.
We need certain auxiliary concepts. Consider any polynomially bounded formula H , any legal position Φ of H , and
any legal move α (by whichever player ℘) in position Φ . In this context, we say that α is unreasonable if it signiﬁes a
choice of a constant c for a variable y in a unionsqy(S(y, z) ∧ G) or y(S(y, z) → G) (depending on whether ℘ =  or ℘ = ⊥)
subcomponent of H , such that c violates the conditions on its size imposed by the sizebound S(y, z). Rather than trying to
turn this otherwise clear intuitive explanation into a strict deﬁnition, providing an example would be suﬃcient. Let H be
the formula 0 = 0∧unionsqy(|y| |z|′ ∧ z = y0). Then the move 1.1111 is unreasonable in position 〈⊥11〉. That is because this
move signiﬁes choosing the constant 1111 for y. And the move ⊥11 of the position has set the value of z to 11 and hence
the value of |z| to 2. So, the condition |y|  |z|′ , i.e. |1111|  |11|′ , is violated. Any other move 1.n with |n| > 3, such as
1.1000 or 1.111111111, would also be unreasonable in that position.
We replace N by its “reasonable counterpart” N ′ — an HPM which never makes unreasonable moves but otherwise is
essentially the same as N . Namely, N ′ is a machine that works just like N , with the difference that, every time N makes
an unreasonable move that chooses some (offensively long) constant c for a variable bound by a (bounded) quantiﬁer
of F (0), N ′ chooses (the always safe) 0 instead. Note that this does not decrease the chances of the machine to win,
as unreasonable moves always result in the corresponding subgames’ being lost, anyway. Obviously N ′ can be eﬃciently
constructed from N . Further, the corresponding explicit polynomial bound ξ ′ can also be eﬃciently indicated (the latter
will depend on ξ and the sizebounds of the unionsq-bound variables of F (0)). In a similar fashion, we replace K0,K1 by their
“reasonable counterparts” K′0,K′1 and the corresponding explicit polynomial bounds ζ ′0, ζ ′1 for their time complexities. For
simplicity, we further replace the three bounds ξ ′, ζ ′0, ζ ′1 by the (generously taken) common bound φ = ξ ′ + ζ ′0 + ζ ′1 for the
time complexities of all three machines N ′ , K′0 and K′1.
We now describe an HPM M that solves the conclusion F (x). In this description, we use the term “synchronizing” to
mean applying copycat between two (sub)games of the form A and ¬A. This means copying one player’s moves in A as the
other player’s moves in ¬A, and vice versa. The effect achieved this way is that the games to which A and ¬A eventually
evolve (the ﬁnal positions hit by them, that is) will be of the form A′ and ¬A′ , that is, one will remain the negation of the
other, so that one will be won by a given player iff the other is lost by the same player. Moderated synchronization means
the same, with the only difference that, whenever a player makes an unreasonable move by choosing an (offensively long)
constant c for a variable bound by a bounded quantiﬁer, the move is copied by the synchronizer with c replaced by 0.
Throughout our description and analysis of the work of M, we assume that its adversary never makes illegal moves, for
otherwise M easily detects illegal behavior and retires with victory.
At the beginning, M waits for Environment to choose constants for the free variables of F (x). Assume k is the length of
the constant chosen for the variable x, and the bits of that constant, in the left-to-right order, are b1,b2, . . . ,bk . We shall
also assume here that k 
= 0, for otherwise the case is straightforward. Let d0 be the constant 0 and, for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,k},
let di be the constant b1 · · ·bi . So, the constant chosen by Environment for x is dk . For each i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}, let K′bi stand for
K′0 if bi = 0, and for K′1 if bi = 1. Similarly, let xbi stand for x0 if bi = 0, and for x1 if bi = 1.
After Environment chooses constants for all free variables of F (x), the work of M consists in continuously polling its run
tape to see if Environment has made any new moves, combined with simulating, in parallel, one play of (F (0)) by N ′ and
— for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,k} — one play of (F (x) → F (xbi)) by K′bi . In the simulation of N ′ , M lets the imaginary adversary
of N ′ choose, at the very beginning of the play, the same constants for the free variables of F (0) as M’s adversary chose
for those variables in the real play. In the simulation of each K′bi , M lets the imaginary adversary of K′bi choose, at the
very beginning of the play, the constant di−1 for x and the same constants for all other free variables of F (x) → F (xbi) as
M’s adversary chose for those variables in the real play.
Let F ′(x) be the result of substituting (see Deﬁnition 4.2) in F (x) each free variable of F (x) other than x by the constant
chosen by (the real) Environment for that variable. Thus, after Environment’s initial moves, (F (x)) has been brought down
to F ′(dk). Similarly, after the initial moves by the imaginary adversary of N ′ , (F (0)) will be brought down to F ′(0). And
similarly, for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}, after the initial moves by the imaginary adversary of K′bi , (F (x) → F (xbi)) will be brought
down to F ′(di−1) → F ′(di).
What M does after the above initial moves in the real and simulated plays is that it synchronizes k + 1 pairs of
(sub)games, real or imaginary. Namely:
• It synchronizes — in the moderated sense — the consequent of the imaginary play of F ′(dk−1) → F ′(dk) by K′bk with the
real play of F ′(dk).
• For each i ∈ {1, . . . ,k − 1}, it synchronizes the consequent of the imaginary play of F ′(di−1) → F ′(di) by K′bi with the
antecedent of the imaginary play of F ′(di) → F ′(di+1) by K′bi+1 .
• It synchronizes the imaginary play of F ′(0) (i.e. of F ′(d0)) by N ′ with the antecedent of the imaginary play of F ′(d0) →
F ′(d1) by K′b1 .
Below is an illustration of such synchronization arrangements — indicated by arcs — for the case dk = d4 = 1001:
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N ′ imaginary F
′(0)
K′1 imaginary F ′(0) → F ′(1)
K′0 imaginary F ′(1) → F ′(10)
K′0 imaginary F ′(10) → F ′(100)
K′1 imaginary F ′(100) → F ′(1001)
M real F ′(1001)










This completes our description of M. Remembering our assumption that (N ,K0,K1 and hence) N ′,K′0,K′1 win the
corresponding games, with a little thought it can be seen that M wins F ′(dk) and hence (F (x)), as desired. It now
remains to show that the time complexity of M is also as desired.
Remembering that the machines N ′,K′0,K′1 are “reasonable” and that the synchronization between the real play of
F ′(dk) and the consequent of F ′(dk−1) → F ′(dk) is moderated, one can easily write a term η(
) with a single variable 

such that, if 
 is greater than or equal to the size of any of the constants chosen by Environment for the free variables of
F (x), the sizes of no moves ever made by M or the simulated N ′,K′0,K′1 exceed η(
). For instance, if F (x) is unionsqu(|u| |x| × |z| ∧ v(|v|  |u| + |x| → G)) where G is elementary, then η(
) can be taken to be 
 × 
 + 
 + 0′′′′ (here 0′′′′ is to
account for the size of the preﬁx “.”, “1.” or “0.1.” that any legal move by  in any of the plays that we consider would
take).
For the rest of this proof, pick and ﬁx an arbitrary play (computation branch) of M, and an arbitrary clock cycle c on
which M makes a move α in the real play of F (x). Let h¯ and 
 be the timecost and the background (see Section 7) of
this move, respectively. Let d0, . . . ,dk be as in the description of the work of M. Note that 
 is not smaller than the size
of the greatest of the constants chosen by Environment for the free variables of F (x). Hence, where η is as in the previous
paragraph, we have:
The sizes of no moves ever made by M or the simulated N ′, K′0, K′1 exceed η(
). (22)
The polling, simulation and copycat performed by M do impose some time overhead. But the latter is only (ﬁxed)
polynomial and, in our subsequent analysis, can be safely ignored. Namely, for the sake of simplicity, we are going to
pretend that M copies moves in its copycat routine instantaneously (as soon as detected), and that the times that M ever
spends “thinking” about what move to make are the times during which it is waiting for simulated machines to make one or
several moves. Furthermore, we will pretend that the polling and the several simulations happen in a truly parallel fashion,
in the sense that M spends a single clock cycle on tracing a single computation step of all k + 1 machines simultaneously,
as well as on checking out its run tape to see if Environment has made a new move.
Let β1, . . . , βm be the moves by simulated machines that M detects by time c, arranged according to the times t1 
· · ·  tm of their detections (which, by our simplifying assumptions, coincide with the timestamps of those moves in the
corresponding simulated plays). Let d = c − h¯. Let j be the smallest integer among 1, . . . ,m such that t j  d. Since each
simulated machine runs in time φ, in view of (22) it is clear that t j − d does not exceed φ(η(
)). Nor does ti − ti−1 for
any i with j < i  m. Therefore tm − d  (m − j + 1) × φ(η(
)). Since m, j  1, let us be generous and simply say that
tm − d  m × φ(η(
)). But notice that βm is a move made by K′bk in the consequent of F ′(dk−1) → F (dk), immediately
(by our simplifying assumptions) copied by M in the real play when it made its move α. In other words, c = tm . And
c − d = h¯. So, h¯ does not exceed m × φ(η(
)). And, by (22), the size of α does not exceed m × φ(η(
)), either. But observe
that k  
, and that m cannot exceed k + 1 times the depth (see Section 4) d of F (0); therefore, m  d × (
 + 1). Thus,
(as long as we pretend that there is no polling/simulation/copycat overhead) neither the timecost nor the size of α exceed
d × (
+ 1)× φ(η(
)).
An upper bound for the above function d× (
+ 1)×φ(η(
)), even after “correcting” the latter so as to precisely account
for the so far suppressed polling/simulation/copycat overhead, can be written as an explicit polynomial function τ . The
latter expresses the sought polynomial bound for the time complexity of M.
Thus, we have shown how to construct, from a proof of X , an HPM M and an explicit polynomial function τ such that
M solves X in time τ . Obviously our construction is effective. It remains to see that it also is — or, at least, can be made
— eﬃcient. Of course, at every step of our inductive construction (for each sentence of the proof, that is), the solution M
of the step and its time complexity bound τ is obtained eﬃciently from previously constructed Ms and τ s. This, however,
does not guarantee that the entire construction will be eﬃcient as well. For instance, if the proof has n steps and the size
G. Japaridze / Information and Computation 209 (2011) 1312–1354 1341of each HPM M that we construct for each step is twice the size of the previously constructed HPMs, then the size of the
eventual HPM will exceed 2n and thus the construction will not be eﬃcient, even if each of the n steps of it is so.
A trick that we can use to avoid an exponential growth of the sizes of the machines that we construct and thus achieve
the eﬃciency of the entire construction is to deal with GHPMs instead of HPMs. Namely, assume the proof of X is the
sequence X1, . . . , Xn of sentences, with X = Xn . Let M1, . . . ,Mn be the HPMs constructed as we constructed Ms earlier
at the corresponding steps of our induction. Remember that each such Mi was deﬁned in terms of M j1 , . . . ,M jk for
some j1, . . . , jk < i. For simplicity and uniformity, we may just as well say that each Mi was deﬁned in terms of all
M1, . . . ,Mn , with those M js that were not among M j1 , . . . ,M jk simply ignored in the description of the work of Mi .
Now, for each such Mi , let M′i be the n-ary GHPM whose description is obtained from that of Mi by replacing each
reference to (any previously constructed) M j by “M′j(M′1, . . . ,M′n) where, for each e ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, M′e is the machine
encoded by the eth input”.10 As it is easy to see by induction on i, Mi and M′i(M′1, . . . ,M′n) are essentially the
same, in the sense that our earlier analysis of the play and time complexity of the former applies to the latter just as well.
So, M′n(M′1, . . . ,M′n) wins Xn , i.e. X . At the same time, note that the size of each GHPM M′i is independent of the
sizes of the other (previously constructed) GHPMs. Based on this fact, with some analysis, one can see that then the HPM
M′n(M′1, . . . ,M′n) is indeed constructed eﬃciently.
As for the explicit polynomial bounds τ1, . . . , τn for the time complexities of the n HPMs M′1(M′1, . . . ,M′n), . . . ,M′n(M′1, . . . ,M′n), their sizes can be easily seen to be polynomial in the size of the proof. That is because, for
each i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, the size of τi only increases the sizes of the earlier constructed τ js by adding (rather than mul-
tiplying by) a certain polynomial quantity.11 Thus, the explicit bound τn for the time complexity of the eventual HPM
M′n(M1, . . . ,Mn) is indeed constructed eﬃciently.
14. The extensional completeness of CLA4
This section is devoted to proving the completeness part of Theorem 11.5. It means showing that, for any arithmetical
problem A that has a polynomial time solution, there is a theorem of CLA4 which, under the standard interpretation, equals
(“expresses”) A.
14.1. X , X and χ
So, let us pick an arbitrary polynomial-time-solvable arithmetical problem A. By deﬁnition, A is an arithmetical problem
because, for some sentence X of the language of CLA4, A = X†. For the rest of this section, we ﬁx such a sentence X, and
ﬁx X as an HPM that solves A (and hence X†) in polynomial time. Speciﬁcally, we assume that X runs in time χ , where
χ , which we also ﬁx for the rest of this section, is a single-variable term of the language of PA — and hence can as well
be seen/written as an explicit polynomial function — with χ(x) x for all x. For readability, we also agree that, throughout
the rest of this section, “formula” exclusively means a subformula of X , in which some variables may be renamed.
X may not necessarily be provable in CLA4, and our goal is to construct another sentence X for which, just like for X ,
we have A = X† and which, perhaps unlike X , is provable in CLA4.
Remember our convention about identifying formulas of the language of CLA4 with (the games that are) their standard
interpretations. So, in the sequel, just as we have done so far, we shall typically write E, F , . . . to mean either E, F , . . . or
E†, F †, . . . . Similar conventions apply to terms as well. In fact, we have already used this convention when saying that X
runs in time χ . What was really meant was that it runs in time χ †.
14.2. Preliminary insights
Our proof is a little long and, in the process of going through it, it is easy to get lost in the forest and stop seeing it for
the trees. Therefore, it might be worthwhile to try to get some preliminary insights into the basic idea behind this proof
before venturing into its details.
Let us consider the simplest nontrivial special case where X is
x(Y (x) unionsq Z(x))
for some elementary formulas Y (x) and Z(x) (perhaps Z(x) is ¬Y (x), in which case X expresses an ordinary decision
problem — the problem of deciding the predicate Y (x)).
The assertion “X does not win X in time χ ” can be formalized in the language of PA through as a certain sentence L.
Then we let the earlier mentioned X be the sentence
x((Y (x)∨L) unionsq (Z(x)∨L)).
10 For simplicity, here we assume that every number is a code of some n-ary GHPM; alternatively,M′i can be deﬁned so that it does nothing if any of its
relevant inputs is not the code of some n-ary GHPM.
11 The fact that we represent complexity bounds as explicit polynomial functions rather than polynomial tree-terms or even graph-terms is relevant here.
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This means that X and X , as games, are the same, that is, X† = X†. It now remains to understand why CLA4  X .
A central lemma here is one establishing that the work of X is “provably traceable”. Roughly, in our present case this
means the provability of the fact that, for any () value chosen for x by Environment — let us continue referring to that
value as x — we can tell (unionsq) the conﬁguration of X in the corresponding play of X at any given time t . Letting X work for
χ(x) steps, one of the following four eventual scenarios should take place, and the provable traceability of the work of X
can be shown to imply that CLA4 proves the unionsq-disjunction of sentences describing those scenarios:
Scenario 1: X makes the move 0 (and no other moves).
Scenario 2: X makes the move 1 (and no other moves).
Scenario 3: X does not make any moves.
Scenario 4: X makes an illegal move (perhaps after ﬁrst making a legal move 0 or 1).
In the case of Scenario 1, the play over X hits Y (x)∨L. And CLA4 — in fact, PA — proves that, in this case, Y (x)∨L is true.
The truth of Y (x)∨L is indeed very easily established: if it was false, then Y (x) should be false, but then the play of X over
X hits the false Y (x) and hence is lost, but then L is true, but then Y (x) ∨L is true. Thus, CLA4  (Scenario 1) → Y (x) ∨L,
from which, by LC, CLA4  (Scenario 1) → X . The case of Scenario 2 is symmetric.
In the case of Scenario 3, (CLA4 proves that) X loses, i.e. L is true, and hence, say, Y (x) ∨ L (or Z(x) ∨ L if you like) is
true. That is, CLA4  (Scenario 3) → Y (x)∨L, from which, by LC, CLA4  (Scenario 3) → X . The case of Scenario 4 is similar.
Thus, for each i ∈ {1,2,3,4}, CLA4  (Scenario i) → X . And, as mentioned, we also have
CLA4  (Scenario 1) unionsq (Scenario 2) unionsq (Scenario 3) unionsq (Scenario 4).
The desired CLA4  X follows from the above provabilities by LC.
The above was about the pathologically simple case of X = x(Y (x) unionsq Z(x)), and the general case will be much more
complex, of course. Among other things, showing the provability of X would require a certain metainduction on its com-
plexity, which we did not need in the present case. But the idea that we have just tried to explain would still remain valid
and central, only requiring certain — nontrivial yet doable — adjustments and reﬁnements.
14.3. The sentence L
By a literal we mean , ⊥, or an atomic formula with or without negation ¬. By a politeral of a formula we mean a
positive (not in the scope of ¬) occurrence of a literal in it. For instance, the occurrence of p, as well as of ¬q (but not q),
is a politeral of p ∧ ¬q. While a politeral is not merely a literal but a literal L together with a ﬁxed occurrence, we shall
often refer to it just by the name L of the literal, assuming that it is clear from the context which (positive) occurrence of
L is meant.
We assume that the reader is suﬃciently familiar with Gödel’s technique of encoding and arithmetizing. Using that
technique, we can construct a sentence L of the language of PA which asserts “X does not win X in time χ ”. Namely, let
E1(x), . . . , En(x) be all subformulas of X , where all free variables of each Ei(x) are among x (but not necessarily vice versa).
Then L is the ∨-disjunction of natural formalizations of the following statements:
1. There is a -illegal position of X spelled on the run tape of X on some clock cycle of some computation branch of X .
2. There is a clock cycle c in some computation branch of X on which X makes a move whose timecost exceeds χ(
), where 
 is the
background of c.
3. There is a (ﬁnite) legal run Γ of X generated by X and a tuple c of constants (c of the same length as x) such that:
• 〈Γ 〉X = E1(c), and we have ¬‖E1(c)‖ (i.e., ‖E1(c)‖ is false),
• or . . . , or
• 〈Γ 〉X = En(c), and we have ¬‖En(c)‖ (i.e., ‖En(c)‖ is false).
14.4. The overline notation
As we remember, our goal is to construct a formula X which expresses the same problem as X does and which is
provable in CLA4. For any formula E — including X — we let E be the result of replacing in E every politeral L by L ∨L.
Lemma 14.1. Any literal L is equivalent (in the standard model of arithmetic) to L ∨L.
Proof. That L implies L ∨L is immediate, as the former is a disjunct of the latter. For the opposite direction, suppose L ∨L
is true at a given valuation e. Its second disjunct cannot be true, because X does win X in time χ , contrary to what L
asserts. So, the ﬁrst disjunct, i.e. L, is true. 
Lemma 14.2. For any formula E, including X, we have E† = E† .
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In view of the above lemma, what now remains to do for the completion of our completeness proof is to show that
CLA4  X . The rest of the present section is entirely devoted to this task.
Lemma 14.3. For any formula E, CLA4  L→ ∀E.
Proof. Induction on the complexity of E . The base, which is about the cases where E is a literal, is straightforward, as then
L is a disjunct of E . If E has the form H0 ∧ H1, H0 ∨ H1, H0  H1 or H0 unionsq H1 then, by the induction hypothesis, CLA4
proves L → ∀H0 and L → ∀H1, from which L → ∀E follows by LC. Similarly, if E has the form ∀xH(x), ∃xH(x), xH(x) orunionsqxH(x), then, by the induction hypothesis, CLA4 proves L→ ∀H(x), from which L→ ∀E follows by LC. 
14.5. The single-circle and double-circle notations
The way we encode conﬁgurations through natural numbers will be precisely described later in Appendix A.1. For now, it
would be suﬃcient to say that the size of the code of a conﬁguration is always greater than the background (see Section 7)
of the corresponding clock cycle in the corresponding play. For readability, we will often identify conﬁgurations with their
codes and say something like “a is a conﬁguration” when what is precisely meant is “a is the code of a conﬁguration”.
By a legitimate conﬁguration we shall mean a conﬁguration of X that might have occurred in some computation branch
B of X such that the run spelled by B is a legal run of X . The yield of such a conﬁguration is the game 〈Φ〉X , where Φ is
the position spelled on the run tape in that conﬁguration.
By a deterministic successor of a legitimate conﬁguration x we mean the conﬁguration y such that y immediately
follows x (in one transition) in the scenario where Environment does not move during the cycle described by x. For n 0,
the nth deterministic successor of x is deﬁned inductively by stipulating that the 0th deterministic successor of x is x, and
the (n+ 1)th deterministic successor of x is the deterministic successor of the nth deterministic successor of x.
Let E(s) be a formula all of whose free variables are among s (but not necessarily vice versa), and z be a variable not
among s. We will write E◦(z,s) to denote an elementary formula whose free variables are z and those of E(s), and which
is a natural arithmetization of the predicate that, for any constants a,c in the roles of z,s, holds (that is, E◦(a,c) is true) iff
a is a legitimate conﬁguration and its yield is E(c). Further, we will write E◦◦(z,s) to denote an elementary formula whose
free variables are z and those of E(s), and which is a natural arithmetization of the predicate that, for any constants a,c in
the roles of z,s, holds iff E◦(a,c)∧ E◦(b,c) is true, where b is the χ(|a|)th deterministic successor of a.
We say that a formula E is critical iff one of the following conditions is satisﬁed:
• E is of the form G0 unionsq G1 or unionsqyG;
• E is of the form ∀yG or ∃yG , and G is critical;
• E is of the form G0 ∨ G1, and both G0 and G1 are critical;
• E is of the form G0 ∧ G1, and at least one of G0,G1 is critical.
Lemma 14.4. Assume E(s) is a non-critical formula all of whose free variables are among s. Then
PA  ∀(E◦◦(z,s) →
∥
∥E(s)∥∥).
Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma. Argue in PA. Consider arbitrary (∀) values of z and s, which we continue
writing as z and s. Suppose, for a contradiction, that E◦◦(z,s) is true but ‖E(s)‖ is false. The falsity of ‖E(s)‖ implies the
falsity of ‖E(s)‖. This is so because the only difference between the two formulas is that, wherever the latter has some
politeral L, the former has a ∨-disjunction containing L as a disjunct.
The truth of E◦◦(z,s) implies that X reaches the conﬁguration (computation step) z and, in the scenario where Environ-
ment does not move, X does not move either for at least χ(|z|) steps afterwards. If X does not move even after χ(|z|)
steps, then it has lost the game, because the eventual position hit by the latter is E(s) and the elementarization of the latter
is false (it is not hard to see that every such game is indeed lost). And if X does make a move sometime after χ(|z|) steps,
then it violates its time complexity bound χ , because the background of that move is smaller than |z| but the timecost is
at least χ(|z|). Thus, in either case, X does not win X in time χ , that is,
L is true. (23)
Consider any non-critical formula G . By induction on the complexity of G , we are going to show that ‖G‖ is true for any
(∀) values of its free variables. Indeed:
If G is a literal, then ‖G‖ is G ∨L which, by (23), is true.
If G is H0  H1 or xH(x), then ‖G‖ is  and is thus true.
G cannot be H0 unionsq H1 or unionsqxH(x), because then it would be critical.
If G is ∀yH(y) or ∃yH(y), then ‖G‖ is ∀y‖H(y)‖ or ∃y‖H(y)‖. In either case ‖G‖ is true because, by the induction
hypothesis, ‖H(y)‖ is true for every value of its free variables, including variable y.
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Hence so is ‖H0‖ ∧ ‖H1‖ which, in turn, is nothing but ‖G‖.
Finally, if G is H0 ∨ H1, then one of the formulas Hi is non-critical. Hence, by the induction hypothesis, ‖Hi‖ is true.
Hence so is ‖H0‖ ∨ ‖H1‖ which, in turn, is nothing but ‖G‖.
Thus, for any non-critical formula G , ‖G‖ is true. This includes the case G = E(s) which, however, contradicts our as-
sumption that ‖E(s)‖ is false. 
Lemma 14.5. Assume E(s) is a critical formula all of whose free variables are among s. Then
CLA4  ∃E◦◦(z,s) → ∀E(s). (24)
Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma. By induction on complexity, one can easily see that the elementarization of
any critical formula is false. Thus, for whatever (∀) values of s, ‖E(s)‖ is false. Arguing further as we did in the proof of
Lemma 14.4 when deriving (23), we ﬁnd that, if E◦◦(z,s) is true for whatever (∃) values of z and s, then so is L. And this
argument can be formalized in PA, so that we have PA  ∃E◦◦(z,s) → L. This, together with Lemma 14.3, can be easily seen
to imply (24) by LC. 
14.6. Q.E.D.
In this subsection we ﬁnish the extensional completeness proof for CLA4. Well, almost ﬁnish. The point is that our
argument relies on Lemma 14.6 whose proof is postponed to Appendix A. Here we only present a brief intuitive explanation
of the proof idea for it. A reader satisﬁed by our explanation will have no reasons to go through the technical appendix
given at the end of this paper, whose only purpose is to provide a relatively detailed proof for Lemma 14.6.
Let E be a formula not containing the variable y. We say that a formula H is a (⊥, y)-development of E iff H is the
result of replacing in E:
• either a surface occurrence of a subformula F0  F1 by Fi (i = 0 or i = 1),
• or a surface occurrence of a subformula xF (x) by F (y).
(, y)-development is deﬁned in the same way, only with unionsq,unionsq instead of , .
Lemma 14.6. Assume E(s) is a formula all of whose free variables are among s, and y is a variable not occurring in E(s). Then:
(a) For every (⊥, y)-development Hi(y,s) of E(s), CLA4 proves E◦◦(z,s) → unionsquH◦i (u, y,s).
(b) Where H1(y,s), . . . , Hn(y,s) are all of the (, y)-developments of E(s), CLA4 proves
E◦(z,s) → E◦◦(z,s) unionsqL unionsqunionsquunionsqyH◦1(u, y,s) unionsq · · · unionsq unionsquunionsqyH◦n(u, y,s). (25)
Proof idea. E◦(z,s) implies that z is a conﬁguration reached by X in some play, and the game by that time has been
brought down to E(s). E◦◦(z,s) additionally implies that this situation persists “for a while” after z.
For clause (a), assume E◦◦(z,s). For any (⊥, y)-development Hi(y,s) of E(s) and any value of y, Hi(y,s) is the game to
which E(s) is brought down by a certain labmove ⊥α. To solve unionsquH◦i (u, y,s) — i.e., make H◦i (u, y,s) true — we can choose
u to be the result of appending such a labmove ⊥α to the run tape content of the deterministic successor of conﬁguration z.
After properly formalizing encoding for conﬁgurations, this argument can be reproduced in CLA4.
For clause (b), assume E◦(z,s). We can trace, within CLA4, the work of X for “suﬃciently many” — namely, χ(|z|)
— steps in the scenario where Environment does not move. If X does not move during those χ(|z|) steps either, then
E◦◦(z,s) is true and we can choose it in the consequent of (25). Suppose now X makes a move α within χ(|z|) steps.
If α is illegal, then L is true, and we choose the latter in the consequent of (25). Otherwise, if α is a legal move, then
it brings E(s) down to one of (the instances of) its (, y)-developments Hi(y,s) for a certain value of y. We choose the
corresponding unionsq-disjunct in the consequent of (25); further, by tracing the work of X , we will be able to compute the value
of the conﬁguration u in which X made the above move, as well the above-mentioned “certain value of y”. By choosing
these values for the variables u and y in unionsquunionsqyH◦1(u, y,s), we win the game. Again, after properly formalizing encoding for
conﬁgurations, the entire argument can be reproduced in CLA4. 
Lemma 14.7. Assume E(s) is a formula all of whose free variables are among s. Then CLA4 proves E◦(z,s) → E(s).
Proof. We prove this lemma by (meta)induction on the complexity of E(s). By the induction hypothesis, for any (⊥, y)- or
(, y)-development Hi(y,s) of E(s) (if there are any), CLA4 proves
H◦(u, y,s) → Hi(y,s). (26)i
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respectively.12 Assume E◦(b, a) is true (if not, we win). Our goal is to show how to win E(a). From clause (b) of Lemma 14.6,
the resource (25) with b, a plugged for z,s is at our disposal. Since the antecedent of the latter is true, the provider of (25)
will have to choose one of the unionsq-disjuncts in the consequent
E◦◦(b, a) unionsqL unionsqunionsquunionsqyH◦1(u, y, a) unionsq · · · unionsq unionsquunionsqyH◦n(u, y, a). (27)
Case 1: L is chosen in (27). It has to be true, or else the provider loses. By Lemma 14.3, we also have the resource
L → ∀E(s). Since its antecedent L is true, we know how to win the consequent ∀E(s). But a strategy that wins the latter,
of course, also wins our target E(a).
Case 2: One of unionsquunionsqyH◦i (u, y, a) is chosen in (27). This should be followed by a further choice of some constants c and
d for u and y, yielding H◦i (c,d, a). Plugging a, c and d for s, u and y in (26), we get H◦i (c,d, a) → Hi(d, a). We may assume
that the antecedent of the latter is true, or else the provider of (27) lied when bringing the latter down to H◦i (c,d, a). Thus,
the consequental resource Hi(d, a) is at our disposal. But, remembering that the formula Hi(y,s) is a (, y)-development of
the formula E(s), we can now win E(a) by making a move α that brings the latter down to Hi(d, a), which we already know
how to win. For example, imagine E(s) is Y (s) → Z(s)unionsq T (s) and Hi(y,s) is Y (s) → Z(s), so that E(a) is Y (a) → Z(a)unionsq T (a)
and Hi(d, a) is Y (a) → Z(a). Then the above move α will be “1.0”. It indeed brings Y (a) → Z(a)unionsqT (a) down to Y (a) → Z(a).
As another example, imagine E(s) is Y (s) → unionsqwZ(w,s) and Hi(y,s) is Y (s) → Z(y,s), so that E(a) is Y (a) → unionsqwZ(w, a)
and Hi(d, a) is Y (a) → Z(d, a). Then the above move α will be “1.d”. It indeed brings Y (a) → unionsqwZ(w, a) down to Y (a) →
Z(d, a).
Case 3: E◦◦(b, a) is chosen in (27). It has to be true, or else the provider loses.
Subcase 3.1: The formula E(s) is critical. Since E◦◦(b, a) is true, so is ∃E◦◦(z,s). By Lemma 14.5, we also have ∃E◦◦(z,s) →
∀E(s). So, we have a strategy that wins ∀E(s). Of course, the same strategy also wins E(a).
Subcase 3.2: The formula E(s) is not critical. By Lemma 14.4, we ﬁnd that the elementarization of E(a) is true. This
obviously means that if Environment does not move in E(a), we win the latter. So, assume Environment makes a move α
in E(a). The move should be legal, or else we win. Of course, the same move is a legal move of E(a) and, for one of the
(⊥, y)-developments Hi(y,s) of the formula E(s) and some constant c, it brings E(a) down to Hi(c, a) as well as E(a) down
to Hi(c, a). For example, if E(s) is Y (s) → Z(s)  T (s), α could be the move “1.0”, which brings Y (a) → Z(a)  T (a) down
to Y (a) → Z(a); the formula Y (s) → Z(s) is indeed a (⊥, y)-development of the formula Y (s) → Z(s)  T (s). As another
example, imagine E(s) is Y (s) → wZ(w,s). Then the above move α could be “1.c”, which brings Y (a) → wZ(w, a)
down to Y (a) → Z(c, a); the formula Y (s) → Z(y,s) is indeed a (⊥, y)-development of the formula Y (s) → wZ(w,s).
Fix the above formula Hi(y,s) and constant c. Choosing b, a and c for z, s and y in the resource provided by clause (a) of
Lemma 14.6, we get the resource E◦◦(b, a) → unionsquH◦i (u, c, a). Since the antecedent of the latter is true by our assumptions, the
consequent unionsquH◦i (u, c, a) is at our disposal. The provider will have to choose a constant d for u in it such that H◦i (d, c, a)
is true. Hence, by choosing d, c and a for u, y and s in (26), we get the resource Hi(c, a). That is, we have a strategy for
the game Hi(c, a) to which E(a) has evolved after Environment’s move α. We switch to that strategy and win. 
Now we are ready to claim the target result of this section. Let a be the code of the start conﬁguration of X , and aˆ be
a standard variable-free term representing a, such as 0 followed by a “′”s. Of course, PA and hence CLA4 proves X◦(aˆ). By
Fact 12.6, CLA4 proves unionsqz(z = aˆ). By Lemma 14.7, CLA4 also proves z(X◦(z) → X). These three can be seen to imply X
by LC. Thus, CLA4  X , as desired.
15. Inherent extensional incompleteness in the general case
The extensional completeness of CLA4 is not a result that could be taken for granted. In this short section we argue
that, if one replaces polynomial time computability by simply computability in our semantical treatment of CLA4, extensional
completeness is impossible to achieve for whatever recursively axiomatizable sound extension of CLA4 or other systems of
clarithmetic.
Our extensional incompleteness argument goes like this. Consider any system S in the style of CLA4 whose proof pred-
icate — throughout this section understood in the “superextended” sense of Section 11 — is decidable and hence the
theoremhood predicate is recursively enumerable. Assume S is sound in the same strong sense as CLA4 — that is, there
is an effective procedure that extracts an algorithmic solution (HPM) for the problem represented by any sentence F from
any S-proof of F .
Let then A(s) be the predicate which is true iff:
• s is (the code of) an S-proof of some sentence of the form x(¬E(x) unionsq E(x)), where E is elementary,
• and E(s) is false.
12 Here, unlike the earlier followed practice, for safety, we are reluctant to use the names z and s for those constants.
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checks if s is the code of an S-proof of some sentence of the form x(¬E(x) unionsq E(x)), where E is elementary. If not, it
rejects. If yes, the procedure extracts from s an HPM H which solves x(¬E(x) unionsq E(x)), and then simulates the play of H
in the scenario where, at the very beginning of the play, Environments makes the move s, thus bringing the game down to
¬E(s) unionsq E(s). If, in this play, H responds by choosing ¬E(s), then the procedure accepts s; and if H responds by choosing
E(s), then the procedure rejects s. Obviously this procedure indeed decides the predicate A.
Now, assume that S is extensionally complete. Since A is decidable, the problem x(¬A(x) unionsq A(x)) has an algorithmic
solution. So, for some sentence F with F † = x(¬A(x)unionsq A(x)) and some c, we should have that c is (the code of) an S-proof
of F . Obviously F should have the form x(¬E(x) unionsq E(x)), where E(x) is an elementary formula with E†(x) = A(x). We are
now dealing with the absurd of A(c) being true iff it is false.
16. On the intensional strength of CLA4
Theorem 16.1. Let X and L be as in Section 14. Then CLA4  ¬L→ X.
Proof. Let X and L be as in Section 14, and so be the meaning of the overline notation. First, by induction on the complexity
of E , we want to show that
For any formula E,CLA4  ∀(E ∧ ¬L→ E). (28)
If E is a literal, then ∀(X ∧ ¬L → E) is nothing but ∀((E ∨ L) ∧ ¬L → E). This is a classically valid elementary sentence,
and hence it is provable in CLA4 (by LC from the empty set of premises). Next, suppose E is F0 ∧ F1. By the induction
hypothesis, CLA4 proves both ∀(F0 ∧¬L→ F0) and ∀(F1 ∧¬L→ F1). These two, by LC, imply ∀((F0 ∧ F1)∧¬L→ F0 ∧ F1).
And the latter is nothing but the desired ∀(E ∧¬L→ E). The remaining cases where E is F0 ∨ F1, F0  F1, F0 unionsq F1, xF (x),unionsqxF (x), ∀xF (x) or ∃xF (x) are handled in a similar way. (28) is thus proven.
(28) implies that CLA4 proves X ∧ ¬L → X . As established in Section 14, CLA4 also proves X . From these two, by LC,
CLA4 proves ¬L→ X , as desired. 
Remember that, in Section 14, X was an arbitrary CLA4-sentence assumed to have a polynomial time solution under the
standard interpretation †. And ¬L was a certain true sentence of the language of classical Peano arithmetic. We showed in
that section that CLA4 proved a certain sentence X with X† = X†. That is, we showed that X was “extensionally provable”.
According to our present Theorem 16.1, in order to make X also provable in the intensional sense, all we need is to add to
the axioms of CLA4 the true elementary sentence ¬L.
In philosophical terms, the import of Theorem 16.1 is that the culprit of the intensional incompleteness of CLA4 is
the (Gödel’s) incompleteness of its classical, elementary part. Otherwise, the “nonelementary rest” of CLA4 — the two
extra-Peano axioms and the CLA4-Induction rule — as a bridge from classical arithmetic to polynomial-time-computability-
oriented clarithmetic, is complete in a certain very strong and natural sense. Namely, it guarantees not only extensional but
also intensional provability of every polynomial time computable problem as long as all necessary true elementary sentences
are taken care of. This means that if, instead of PA, we take the truth arithmetic Th(N) (the set of all true sentences of the
language of PA) as the base arithmetical theory, the corresponding version of CLA4 will be not only extensionally, but also
intensionally complete. Unfortunately, however, such a system will no longer be recursively axiomatizable.
To summarize, in order to make CLA4 intensionally stronger, it would be suﬃcient to add to it new true elementary
(classical) sentences only. Note that this sort of an extension, even if in a language more expressive than that of PA, would
automatically remain sound and extensionally complete: virtually nothing in this paper relies on the fact that PA is not
stronger than it really is. Thus, basing applied theories on CoL allows us to construct ever more expressive and intensionally
strong theories without worrying about how to preserve soundness and extensional completeness. Among the main goals
of this paper was to illustrate the scalability of CoL rather than the virtues of the particular system CLA4 based on it. The
latter is in a sense arbitrary, as is PA itself: in the role of the classical part of CLA4, we could have chosen not only any
true extension of PA, but certain weaker-than-PA theories as well, for our proof of the extensional completeness of CLA4
does not require the full strength of PA. The reason for not having done so is purely “pedagogical”: PA is the simplest and
best known arithmetical theory, and reasoning in it is much more relaxed, easy and safe than in weaker versions. CLA4 is
thus the simplest and nicest representative of the wide class of clarithmetical theories for polynomial time computability,
all enjoying the same relevant properties as CLA4 does.
As pointed out in Section 1, among the potential applications of CLA4-style systems is using them as formal tools (say,
after developing reasonable theorem-provers) for systematically ﬁnding eﬃcient solutions for problems, and the stronger
such a system is, the better the chances that a solution for a given problem will be found. Of course, what matters in this
context is intensional rather than extensional strength. So, perfect strength is not achievable, but we can keep moving ever
closer to it.
One may ask why not think of simply using PA (or even, say, ZFC) instead of CLA4 for the same purposes: after all, PA is
strong enough to allow us reason about polynomial time computability. This is true, but PA is far from being a reasonable
alternative to CLA4. First of all, as a tool for ﬁnding solutions, PA is very indirect and hence hopelessly ineﬃcient. Pick any
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time computable (or even just express this fact) to understand the difference. Such a proof would have to proceed by clumsy
reasoning about non-number objects such as Turing machines and computations, which, only by good luck, happen to be
amenable to being understood as numbers through encoding. In contrast, reasoning in CLA4 is directly about numbers and
their properties, without having to encode any foreign (metaarithmetical or complexity-theoretical) beasts and then try
to reason about them as if they were just kind and innocent natural numbers. Secondly, even if an unimaginably strong
theorem-prover succeeded in ﬁnding such a proof, there would be no direct use of it because, from a proof of the existence
of a solution we cannot directly extract a solution. Furthermore, even knowing that a given HPM X solves the problem in
some polynomial time χ , would have no practical signiﬁcance without knowing what particular polynomial χ is, in order
to assess whether it is reasonable for our purposes, or takes us beyond the number of nanoseconds in the lifespan of the
universe (after all, 
999
999
is also a polynomial function!). In order to actually obtain a solution and a polynomial bound
for it, one would need a constructive proof, that is, not just a proof that a polynomial function χ and a χ -time solution
exist, but a proof of the fact that certain particular numbers a and b are (the codes of) a polynomial term χ and a χ -time
solution X . Otherwise, a theorem-prover would have to be used not just once for a single target formula, but an indeﬁnite
(intractably many) number of times, once per each possible pair of values of a, b until the “right” values are encountered.
To summarize, PA does not provide any reasonable mechanism for handling queries in the style “ﬁnd a polynomial time
solution for problem A”: in its standard form, PA is merely a YES/NO kind of a “device”.
The above dark picture can be somewhat brightened by switching from PA to Heyting’s arithmetic HA — the version
of PA based on intuitionistic logic instead of classical logic, which is known to allow us to directly extract, from a proof
of a formula ∃xF (x), a particular value of x for which F (x) is true. But the question is why intuitionistic logic and not
CoL? Both claim to be “constructive logics”, but the constructivistic claims of CoL have a clear semantical meaning and
justiﬁcation, while intuitionistic logic is essentially an ad hoc invention whose constructivistic claims are mainly based
on certain syntactic and hence circular considerations,13 without being supported by a convincing and complete formal
constructive semantics. And, while HA is immune to the second one of the two problems pointed out in the previous
paragraph, it still suffers from the ﬁrst problem. At the same time, as a reasoning tool, HA is inferior to PA, for it is
intensionally weaker and, from the point of view of the philosophy of CoL, is so for no good reasons. As a simple example,
consider the function f deﬁned by “ f (x) = x if PA is either consistent or inconsistent, and f (x) = 2x otherwise”. This is
a legitimately deﬁned function, and we all — just as PA — know that extensionally it is the same as the identity function
f (x) = x. Yet, HA can be seen to fail to prove — in the intensional sense — its computability. Despite its name, intuitionistic
logic is not so “intuitive” after all!
A natural question to ask is: Is there a sentence X of the language of CLA4whose polynomial time computability is constructively
provable in PA yet X is not provable in CLA4? Remember that, as we agreed just a while ago, by constructive provability of the
polynomial time computability of X in PA we mean that, for some particular HPM X and a particular polynomial (term)
χ , PA proves that X is a χ -time solution of X . If the answer to this question was positive, then PA, while indirect and
ineﬃcient, would still have at least something to say in its defense when competing with CLA4 as a problem-solving tool.
But, as seen from the following theorem, the answer to the question is negative:
Theorem 16.2. Let X be any sentence of the language of CLA4 such that PA constructively proves (in the above sense) the polynomial
time computability of X . Then CLA4  X.
Proof. Consider any sentence X of the language of CLA4. Assume PA constructively proves the polynomial time computabil-
ity of X , meaning that, for a certain HPM X and a certain term χ , PA proves that X solves X in time χ . But this is exactly
what the sentence L of Section 14 denies. So, PA  ¬L. But, by Theorem 16.1, we also have CLA4  ¬L→ X . Consequently,
CLA4  X . 
An import of the above theorem is that, if we tried to add to CLA4 some new nonelementary axioms in order to achieve
a properly greater intensional strength, the fact that such axioms are computable in time χ for some particular polynomial
χ would have to be unprovable in PA, and hence would have to be “very nontrivial”. The same applies to attempts to extend
CLA4 through some new rules of inference.
17. Give Caesar what belongs to Caesar
Beginning from Buss’s seminal work [6], many complexity-sensitive or complexity-oriented arithmetical and logical sys-
tems have been developed by various authors ([3,7–10,33,35] and more). Most of those achieve control over complexity in
ways very different from ours, such as by type information rather than by explicit bounds on quantiﬁers, for which reason
13 What creates circularity is the common-sense fact that syntax is merely to serve a meaningful semantics, rather than vice versa. It is hard not to
remember the following words from [26] here: “The reason for the failure of P unionsq ¬P in CoL is not that this principle . . . is not included in its axioms.
Rather, the failure of this principle is exactly the reason why this principle, or anything else entailing it, would not be among the axioms of a sound system
for CoL”.
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metic is closest to — and the most immediate precursor of — our approach. In fact, in a broad sense, CLA4 is a system
of bounded arithmetic, only based on CoL instead of classical logic or intuitionistic logic on which the other systems of
bounded arithmetic have been traditionally based.
The main relevant results in the studies of classical-logic-based bounded arithmetic, extensive surveys of which can be
found in [11,32], can be summarized saying that, by appropriately weakening the induction axiom of PA and restricting it
to bounded formulas of certain forms, and correspondingly readjusting the nonlogical vocabulary and axioms of PA, certain
soundness and completeness for the resulting system(s) S can be achieved. Such soundness results typically read like “If S
proves a formula of the form ∀x∃yF (x, y), where F satisﬁes such and such constraints, then there is function of such and
such computational complexity which, for each a, returns a b with F (a,b)”. And completeness results typically read like
“For any function f of such and such computational complexity, there is an S-provable formula of the form ∀x∃yF (x, y)
such that, for any a and b, F (a,b) is true iff b = f (a)”.
Among the characteristics that make our approach very different from the above (as well as any other complexity-
oriented systems of arithmetic known to the author), one should point out that it extends rather than restricts the language
and the deductive power of PA. Restricting PA can be seen as throwing out the baby with the bath water. Not only does
it expel from the system many complexity-theoretically unsound yet otherwise meaningful and useful theorems, but it
also reduces — even if only in the intensional rather than extensional sense — the class of complexity-theoretically correct
provable principles. This is a necessary sacriﬁce, related to the inability of the underlying classical logic to clearly differen-
tiate between constructive (,unionsq,,unionsq) and “ordinary”, non-constructive versions (∧,∨,∀,∃) of operators. The inadequacy
of classical logic as a basis for constructive systems also shows itself in the fact that the above-mentioned soundness and
completeness results are only partial.
The above problem of partiality is partially overcome when one bases a complexity-oriented arithmetic on intuition-
istic logic [7,35] instead of classical logic. In this case, soundness/completeness extends to all formulas of the form
∀x∃yF (x, y), without the “F satisﬁes such and such constraints” condition (the reason why we still consider this sort of
soundness/completeness partial is that it remains limited to formulas of the form ∀x∃yF (x, y), i.e. functions, which, for us,
are only special cases of computational problems). However, for reasons pointed out in the previous section, switching to
intuitionistic logic signiﬁes throwing out even more of the “baby” from the bath tub, further decreasing the intensional
strength of the theory and probably losing its intuitive clarity or appeal in the eyes of the classically-minded majority.
Both classical-logic-based and intuitionistic-logic-based systems of bounded arithmetic happen to be inherently weak the-
ories, as opposed to our CoL-based version, which is as strong as Gödel’s incompleteness phenomenon permits, and which
can be indeﬁnitely strengthened without losing computational soundness. We owe this achievement to the fact that CoL
gives Caesar what belongs to Caesar, and God what belongs to God. As we had a chance to see throughout this paper,
classical (∧,∨,∀,∃) and constructive (,unionsq,,unionsq) logical constructs can peacefully coexist and complement each other in
one natural system that seamlessly extends the classical, constructive, resource- and complexity-conscious visions and con-
cepts, and does so not by mechanically putting things together, but rather on the basis of one natural, all-unifying, complete
game semantics. Unlike most other approaches where only few, special-form expressions (if any) have clear computational
interpretations, in our case every formula is a meaningful computational problem. Further, we can capture not only compu-
tational problems in the traditional sense, but also problems in the more general — interactive — sense.
Classical logic and classical arithmetic, so close (unlike, say, intuitionistic logic or HA) to the heart and mind of all of
us, do not at all need to be rejected or tampered with in order to achieve constructive heights. Just the opposite, they can
be put in faithful and useful service to this noble goal. Our heavy reliance on reasoning in PA throughout this paper is an
eloquent illustration of it. Overall, the present work can be seen as an illustration of the fruitfulness of two independently
conceived lines of thought — bounded arithmetic and computability logic — through a successful marriage between them.
The forthcoming paper [30] constructs three new, incrementally strong systems of clarithmetic, named CLA5, CLA6 and
CLA7. In the same sense as CLA4 is sound and complete with respect to polynomial time computability, these systems are
shown to be sound and complete with respect to polynomial space computability, elementary recursive time computability
and primitive recursive time computability, respectively (as for elementary recursive space and primitive recursive space,
they simply coincide with elementary recursive time and primitive recursive time). The simplicity and elegance of those
systems serves as additional empirical evidence for the naturalness of basing applied theories on CoL instead of the more
traditional alternatives, and for the ﬂexibility and scalability of our approach. All three systems, on top of Axioms 1–7, have
Axiom 8 as the only extra-Peano axiom (Axiom 9 simply becomes derivable and hence redundant due to the presence
of a stronger induction rule). CL12 continues to serve as the logical basis for these systems, and what varies is only the
induction rule. The induction rule of CLA5 differs from that of CLA4 in that, while the (two) inductive steps of the latter
are based on binary successors, the (single) inductive step of the former is based on unary successor, i.e., is the kind old
F (x) → F (x′), with F (x) still required to be a polynomially bounded formula. The system CLA6 is obtained from CLA5 by
relaxing this requirement in the induction rule and, instead, requiring that F (x) be exponentially bounded. And the system
CLA7 is obtained from CLA6 by removing all conditions on F (x) whatsoever, thus leaving the realm of bounded arithmetic.
The earlier mentioned system CLA1 of [27] further strengthens the above series. Its logical basis, just like that of all
clarithmetical theories we have seen, is CL12. And the nonlogical axioms, just as in the case of CLA5, CLA6 and CLA7,
are Axioms 1–8 of Section 11. As we may guess, the only difference between CLA1 and the weaker systems CLA4–CLA7
is (again) related to how the induction rule operates. Here the difference is of a qualitative character due to the fact that
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the corresponding inductive step in CLA1 is a derivation of F (x′) from F (x). In classical systems, according to the deduction
theorem, a formula E is derivable from a formula G iff the formula G → F is provable, so switching to natural deduction in
the style of CLA1 would create no difference. The situation, however, is very different in (the resource-conscious) CoL-based
systems, where deriving E from G is generally easier than proving G → E . This is so because a derivation may “recycle”
its premises while, on the other hand, the antecedent of a →-combination may be “unrecyclable”. For instance, E ∧ E is
always derivable from E but, as we had a chance to see from Exercise 9.5, E → E ∧ E is not always provable (and/or valid).
While derivability of F (x′) from F (x) thus does not generally imply provability of F (x) → F (x′), the latter does always imply
the former. Consequently, CLA1 is at least as strong as CLA7, meaning that CLA1, just like CLA7, can extensionally prove all
primitive recursive time (and/or space) computable problems. A natural expectation here is that, at the same time, CLA1
takes us “far beyond” primitive recursive time (and/or space) computability, even though exactly how far still remains to be
understood.
Appendix A
Throughout the rest of this appendix, the sole purpose of which is to prove Lemma 14.6, X , X and χ are as in Section 14.
The terms “conﬁguration”, “state”, “tape symbol” etc. exclusively refer to ones of X . We assume that 0 and 1 are among the
tape symbols. blank will stand for the blank tape symbol.
The proofs given in this appendix will heavily and repeatedly rely on PA and the results of Section 12. It is important to
note that, almost always, this reliance will be only implicit.
A.1. Encoding conﬁgurations
In order to prove Lemma 14.6, we need to introduce a system of encoding for various objects of relevance. Whenever O
is such an object, O will stand for its code.
Let A be the set consisting of all states (of X ), and four versions aˆ, aˇ, aˆ, aˇ of every tape symbol a. As opposed to
tape symbols, we refer to the elements of A (simply) as symbols. As we are going to see shortly, in our encoding of
conﬁgurations, aˆ (resp. aˇ) means the tape symbol a written on the work (resp. run) tape, and the presence (resp. absence)
of an underline indicates that the head of the corresponding tape is (resp. is not) currently looking at the cell containing a.
We extend the ˆ , ˇ notation from tape symbols to strings of tape symbols. Namely, for any such string α, αˆ means the
result of replacing every symbol a by aˆ in α. Similarly for αˇ.
We pick and ﬁx a suﬃciently large integer k and, with K standing for 2k throughout the rest of this paper, encode each
symbol a as a natural number a with |a| = K. As practiced earlier, terminologically and notationally we identify such
an a with the corresponding binary numeral. Thus, the codes of symbols are bit strings, all of length K and none starting
with a 0. Needless to mention that different symbols are required to have different codes.
Further, where a1, . . . ,ak is a sequence of symbols, we encode it as the binary numeral — again, identiﬁed with the
corresponding number — a1 · · ·ak. We will not always be careful about differentiating objects from their codes, and
may say something like “the symbol b” where, strictly speaking, the code of that symbol is meant, or vice versa.
We need to make clear what, exactly, is meant by a conﬁguration. According to our earlier informal explanation, this is
a full description of some “current” situation in X , namely, a list indicating the state of X , the locations of its two scanning
heads, and the contents of its two tapes. The tapes, however, are inﬁnite, and we need to agree on how to represent their
contents by ﬁnite means. Remember our convention that a head of an HPM can never move past the leftmost blank cell of
the corresponding tape, and that the work-tape head can never write the blank symbol. This means that every cell to the
left of a blank cell will also be blank and, accordingly, when describing a conﬁguration, it would be suﬃcient to describe
the contents of its tapes up to (including) the leftmost blank cells. Precisely, we agree to understand each conﬁguration C
as the following sequence of symbols:
a, bˆ0, . . . , bˆi−1, bˆi, bˆi+1, . . . , bˆm, cˇ0, . . . , cˇ j−1, cˇ j, cˇ j+1, . . . , cˇn (29)
where, in the context of C , a is the (“current”) state of X , b0 · · ·bm (resp. c0 · · · cn) are the contents of cells #0 through #m
(resp. #n) of the work (resp. run) tape, and i (resp. j) is the cell # of the cell scanned by the head of the work (resp. run)
tape. In addition, both bm = cn = blank while no other bk or ck is blank. We encode the above conﬁguration as any other
sequence of symbols, i.e., as the binary numeral
abˆ0 · · ·bˆi−1bˆibˆi+1 · · ·bˆmcˇ0 · · ·cˇ j−1cˇ jcˇ j+1 · · ·cˇn.
In the sequel, we will be using the pseudoterm x ◦ y and several elementary formulas with special names, each one
being a natural arithmetization of the corresponding predicate shown below:
• x ◦ y abbreviates x × 2|y| + y. Note that, when x and y are the codes of some sequences a1, . . . ,am and b1, . . . ,bn of
symbols, x ◦ y is the code of the concatenation a1, . . . ,am,b1, . . . ,bn of those sequences.
• N(x, y) says “if x is bˆ1, . . . , bˆk for some symbols b1, . . . ,bk (k  0), then y is bˇ1, . . . , bˇk”. So, for instance,
D(1ˆ, .ˆ, 0ˆ,1ˇ, .ˇ, 0ˇ) is true.
1350 G. Japaridze / Information and Computation 209 (2011) 1312–1354• C(x) says “x is the code of a conﬁguration”.
• I(x, y) says “x is the code of a conﬁguration of the form (29), and i = y”.
• J(x, y) says “x is the code of a conﬁguration of the form (29), and j = y”.
• M(x, y) says “x is the code of a conﬁguration of the form (29), and m = y”.
• E(x, y) says “y is the code of the sequence of symbols resulting from changing every 0 to 0ˇ and every 1 to 1ˇ in the
binary numeral representing number x”. So, for instance, E(101,1ˇ, 0ˇ, 1ˇ) is true.
• D(x, y) says “x is bˆ1, . . . , bˆk for some bits b1, . . . ,bk (k  0) where b1 (if present) is 1, and y is the number repre-
sented by the numeral b1 · · ·bk”. So, for instance, D(1ˆ, 0ˆ, 1ˆ,101) is true.
• S(x, y) says “x is the code of a conﬁguration and y is the code of the deterministic successor (see Section 14.5) of that
conﬁguration”.
• A(z, x, y) says “z is the code of a legitimate conﬁguration C (see Section 14.5), x is the code of the yth determin-
istic successor of C , and, for any i with 0  i  y, the state of the ith deterministic successor of C is not a move
state”. A(z, x, y) thus asserts that, after the (legitimate) conﬁguration z, if Environment does not move, X reaches the
conﬁguration x within y (y  0) steps, and it does not move during those steps, either.
• A′(z, y) abbreviates ∃xA(z, x, y). A′(z, y) thus says that, after reaching the (legitimate) conﬁguration z, during the
subsequent y (including 0) steps, if Environment does not move, neither does X .
• B(z, x) says “z is the code of a legitimate conﬁguration C , x is the code of the ith deterministic successor of C for some
i  0 and, for each j with 0 j  i, the state of the jth deterministic successor of C is a move state iff j = i”. B(z, x)
thus asserts that z is a legitimate conﬁguration and x is the earliest conﬁguration after (and including) z in which X
moves in the scenario where Environment does not move.
Lemma A.1. CLA4  unionsqz(z = x ◦ y).
Proof. Immediate in view of the results of Section 12. 
In the sequel, whenever we write K within a formula or while reasoning in CLA4, it is to be understood as a standard
variable-free term representing it. For clarity, let us say that this term is 0 followed by K ′s. We shall implicitly rely on the
fact that CLA4  unionsqz(z = K) (Fact 12.6). Similarly for k, as well as b where b is a symbol.
Lemma A.2. CLA4  unionsqyN(x, y).
Proof. Argue in CLA4. By CLA4-Induction on z, we ﬁrst want to show
K × |z| |x| →unionsqy(|y| |x| ∧N([x]K×|z|0 , y)). (30)
The base K× |0| |x| → unionsqy(|y| |x| ∧N([x]K×|0|0 , y)) is solved by choosing 0 (the code of the empty sequence of symbols)
for y. The left inductive step is
(
K × |z| |x| →unionsqy(|y| |x| ∧N([x]K×|z|0 , y))) → (K × |z0| |x| →unionsqy(|y| |x| ∧N([x]K×|z0|0 , y))).
To solve it, we ﬁrst ﬁgure our whether z = 0 or z 
= 0. If z = 0, we ignore the antecedent and do in the consequent the
same as what we did in the base case. Otherwise, if z 
= 0, we wait till Environment chooses a constant a for y in the
antecedent. Then we compute the value b of [x]K|z|×K (remember Fact 12.11). If b is cˆ for some symbol c (which can be
established by using Fact 12.8 as many times as the number of symbols), then, using Lemma A.1, we compute a ◦ cˇ and
choose the computed value for y in the consequent. Otherwise it does not matter what we choose for y, so choose 0. The
right inductive step is similar but simpler, as we do not need to give the case z = 0 a special consideration. Thus, (30) is
proven.
Remember that K = 2k . Let a be the kth binary predecessor of |x|, that is, we have |x| = ab1 · · ·bk, where each bi is either
0 or 1. Such an a can be found by ﬁrst computing the value of |x| and then, starting from that value, repeatedly computing
binary successor (the constant) k times. Let b be the value of the binary predecessor of 2a . Note that |b| = a. Plugging b for
z in (30), we make this resource compute a value c for which N([x]K×|b|0 , c), i.e. N([x]K×a0 , c), is true. Now notice that, if x
is indeed the code of a sequence of symbols, a is the number of symbols in that sequence and, as the length of the code
of each symbol is K, we have K × a = |x|; hence, we also have [x]K×a0 = x; hence, as N([x]K×a0 , c) is true, so is N(x, c). This
means that we win the target unionsqyN(x, y) by choosing c for y. 
Lemma A.3. CLA4 proves each of the following:
1. C(x) → unionsqyI(x, y).
2. C(x) → unionsqyJ(x, y).
3. C(x) → unionsqyM(x, y).
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Argue in CLA4. Let I′(x, z) be (a natural formalization of) the predicate “x is the code of a conﬁguration of the form (29),
and z < i”. By CLA4-Induction on z, we want to prove
C(x) → I′(x, |z|) unionsqunionsqy(|y| |x| ∧ I(x, y)). (31)
The basis is C(x) → I′(x, |0|) unionsqunionsqy(|y| |x| ∧ I(x, y)). We ﬁnd [x]KK . If the latter is aˆ for some tape symbol a, we choose
the right unionsq-disjunct in the consequent and then choose 0 for y. Otherwise we choose the left disjunct.
The left inductive step is
(
C(x) → I′(x, |z|) unionsqunionsqy(|y| |x| ∧ I(x, y)) → (C(x) → I′(x, |z0|) unionsqunionsqy(|y| |x| ∧ I(x, y)). (32)
To solve it, we wait till Environment chooses a unionsq-disjunct in the antecedent. If the left disjunct is chosen, we ﬁnd [x]K|z0|×K .
If the latter is aˆ for some tape symbol a, we choose the right unionsq-disjunct in the consequent of (32), and specify y as the
value of |z0|; otherwise we choose the left unionsq-disjunct there. Suppose now the right disjunct is chosen by Environment in
the antecedent of (32). We further wait till a constant c is chosen for y there. Then we choose the right unionsq-disjunct in the
consequent of (32), and specify y as c in it. The right inductive step is virtually the same. It is not hard to see that our
strategy is successful.
Now, the target C(x) → unionsqyI(x, y) can be seen to be a logical consequence of (31), the PA-provable fact ∀x∀z(z = |x| →
¬I′(x, z)) and the CLA4-provable sentence xunionsqz(z = |x|). 
Lemma A.4. CLA4  unionsqyE(x, y).
Proof. Argue in CLA4. By CLA4-Induction on x, we want to show unionsqy(|y|  K × |x| ∧ E(x, y)), from which the targetunionsqyE(x, y) immediately follows by LC.
The base unionsqy(|y| K× |0| ∧E(0, y)) is solved by choosing 0 (the code of the empty sequence of symbols) for y. For the
left inductive step
unionsqy(|y| K × |x| ∧E(x, y)) →unionsqy(|y| K × |x0| ∧E(x0, y)),
we ﬁrst ﬁgure out whether x = 0 or not. If yes, we ignore the antecedent and act in the consequent in the same way as in
the basis case. Otherwise, we wait till Environment chooses a constant a for y in the antecedent. Then, using Lemma A.1,
we compute the value b of a ◦ 0ˇ and choose b for y in the consequent. The right inductive step is similar, with the
difference that b should be the value of a ◦ 1ˇ there; also, the case of x= 0 does not require a special handling. 
Lemma A.5. CLA4  ¬∃yD(x, y) unionsqunionsqyD(x, y).
Proof. Argue in CLA4. By CLA4-Induction on z, we want to show that
K × |z| |x| → ¬∃yD([x]K×|z|0 , y
) unionsqunionsqyD([x]K×|z|0 , y). (33)
The basis K × |0|  |x| → ¬∃yD([x]K×|0|0 , y) unionsq unionsqyD([x]K×|0|0 , y) is obviously solved by choosing the right unionsq-disjunct and
specifying y as 0 in it.
The left inductive step is
(
K × |z| |x| → ¬∃yD([x]K×|z|0 , y
) unionsqunionsqyD([x]K×|z|0 , y))
→ (K × |z0| |x| → ¬∃yD([x]K×|z0|0 , y
) unionsqunionsqyD([x]K×|z0|0 , y)).
It is solved as follows. If z = 0, we do in the consequent the same as in the basis case. Suppose now z 
= 0. We wait till
Environment selects a unionsq-disjunct in the antecedent (if there is no such selection, we win). If the left disjunct is selected
there, we also select the left disjunct in the consequent and rest our case. Suppose now Environment selects the right
disjunct. We wait till it further selects a constant a for y there. Then we compute the value b of [x]KK×|z| . If b = 0ˆ, we
select the right unionsq-disjunct in the consequent, compute the value c of a0, and specify y as c there. If b = 1ˆ, we again
select the right unionsq-disjunct in the consequent, compute the value c of a1, and specify y as c there. Finally, if neither b = 0ˆ
nor b = 1ˆ, we select the left disjunct and retire in victory. The right inductive step is the same, with the only difference
that the case z = 0 does not require a special handling there. Obviously our strategy wins, and (33) is thus proven.
Now, to solve the target ¬∃yD(x, y)unionsqunionsqyD(x, y), we use a trick similar to the one employed in the proof of Lemma A.2.
Namely, we compute the value a of the kth binary predecessor of |x|, and then the value b of the binary predecessor of 2a .
Note that |b| = a. Taking into account that K × a |x|, by plugging b for z in (33), we essentially turn this resource into
¬∃yD([x]K×a, y) unionsqunionsqyD([x]K×a, y).0 0
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is true. Note that if x is the code of a sequence of symbols, then K× a is nothing but |x| and hence [x]K×a0 is nothing but x.
With this observation in mind, if ¬∃yD([x]K×a0 , y) is true, then choosing the left disjunct of ¬∃yD(x, y) unionsq unionsqyD(x, y) wins
this game; and, if D([x]K×a0 , c) is true, then choosing the right disjunct and specifying y as c in it wins the game. 
Lemma A.6. CLA4 C(x) → unionsqyS(x, y).
Proof. Argue in CLA4 to justify C(x) → unionsqyS(x, y). Assume that C(x) is true, namely, that x is (the code of) the conﬁgura-
tion (29).
We ﬁnd the state a of x, which is nothing but [x]K0 . Next, using clauses 1 and 2 of Lemma A.3, we ﬁnd the locations i
and j of the two scanning heads. Then, using these i and j, we ﬁnd the symbols b and c seen by the two heads. This allows
us to ﬁnd (within PA) the state d of the deterministic successor y of x, the symbol e that will overwrite the old symbol b
on the work tape, and the directions in which the heads move. We now correspondingly update x in several steps. First of
all, we change the state of x to d. Technically, this is done by computing d ◦ [x]|x|−KK . In a similar fashion, details of which
are left to the reader, we change the old underlined symbol of the work tape to e, and move the two underlines according
to the directions in which the corresponding heads move. In addition, if a is a move state, we ﬁnd the content of the work
tape of the original conﬁguration x up to the location of the work-tape head, and append that content, -preﬁxed and with
each symbol sˆ changed to sˇ using Lemma A.2, to the content of the run tape of x. Finally, if the previously blank cell #m of
the work tape is no longer blank, we insert a blank cell to the right of it in our representation of the conﬁguration (again,
technical details about how, exactly, all this can be done, are left as an easy exercise for the reader). The eventual value of
x, after the above updates, will be exactly the sought value of the deterministic successor of the original x, that is, the value
that we should choose for y in the consequent of C(x) → unionsqyS(x, y). 
Lemma A.7. CLA4 C(z) →A′(z, |r|) unionsqunionsqxB(z, x).
Proof. Argue in CLA4. By CLA4-Induction on r, we want to prove
C(z) →unionsqx(|x| |z| + |r| ∧A(z, x, |r|)) unionsqunionsqx(|x| (|z| + |r|)0∧B(z, x)),
from which the target C(z) →A′(z, |r|) unionsqunionsqxB(z, x) easily follows by LC.
To solve the base
C(z) →unionsqx(|x| |z| + |0| ∧A(z, x, |0|)) unionsqunionsqx(|x| (|z| + |0|)0∧B(z, x)),
we ﬁgure out whether the state of z is a move state or not. If yes, we choose the right unionsq-disjunct; if not, we choose the left
unionsq-disjunct. In either case, we further choose the value of z for the variable x and win.
The left inductive step is
(
C(z) →unionsqx(|x| |z| + |r| ∧A(z, x, |r|)) unionsqunionsqx(|x| (|z| + |r|)0∧B(z, x)))
→ (C(z) →unionsqx(|x| |z| + |r0| ∧A(z, x, |r0|)) unionsqunionsqx(|x| (|z| + |r0|)0∧B(z, x))). (34)
If r = 0, (34) is won by solving its consequent in the same ways as the basis case was solved. Suppose now r 
= 0. To solve
(34), we wait till Environment selects one of the two unionsq-disjuncts in the antecedent.
If the right unionsq-disjunct is selected, we wait further till a constant c for x is selected there. Then we select the right
unionsq-disjunct in the consequent, and choose the same c for x in it.
Suppose now the left unionsq-disjunct is selected in the antecedent of (34). Wait further till a constant c for x is selected there.
We may assume that A(z, c, |r|) is true, or else we win the game. Using Lemma A.6, we ﬁnd the deterministic successor d
of the conﬁguration c. With a little thought, one can see that the size of d cannot exceed the sum of the sizes of z and r0
more than twice, so that |d|  (|z| + |r0|)0 holds. We ﬁgure out whether the state of d is a move state or not. If not, we
select the left unionsq-disjunct in the consequent of (34), otherwise, select the right disjunct. In either case, we further choose d
for x and win.
The right inductive step is virtually the same, with the only difference that the case z = 0 does not require a special
handling. 
A.2. Proof of clause (a) of Lemma 14.6
Assume the conditions of clause (a) of Lemma 14.6.
First, let us consider the case where Hi(y,s) is the result of replacing in E(s) a surface occurrence of a subformula
F0  F1 by F j ( j = 0 or j = 1). Let ⊥α be the labmove that brings E(s) down to Hi(y,s). For instance, if E(s) is G → F0  F1
and Hi(y,s) is G → F0, then ⊥α is “⊥1.0”.
Argue in CLA4 to justify E◦◦(z,s) → unionsquH◦i (u, y,s). Assume E◦◦(z,s). This implies that z is a legitimate conﬁguration with
yield E(s), and that the same holds for the deterministic successor b of z, which we compute using Lemma A.6. Then the
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Hi(y,s). The code of such a conﬁguration is b ◦ ⊥ˇαˇ. We compute the value c of the latter using Lemma A.1, and win
E◦◦(z,s) → unionsquH◦i (u, y,s) by choosing c for u.
Next, consider the case where Hi(y,s) is the result of replacing in E(s) a surface occurrence of a subformula xF (x) by
F (y). Let α be the string such that, for any constant c, the labmove ⊥αc brings E(s) down to Hi(c,s). For instance, if E(s)
is G → xF (x)∨ J and Hi(y,s) is G → F (y)∨ J , then α is “1.0.”; and if E(s) is just xF (x), then α is the empty string.
Argue in CLA4 to justify E◦◦(z,s) → unionsquH◦i (u, y,s). Let c be the value satisfying E(y, c). We compute the latter using
Lemma A.4. Assume E◦◦(z,s). This implies that z is a legitimate conﬁguration with yield E(s). Then the same holds for
the deterministic successor b of z, which we compute using Lemma A.6. Then the result of appending ⊥αy to the run
tape contents of (the conﬁguration encoded by) b is a legitimate conﬁguration with yield H(y,s). The code of such a
conﬁguration is b ◦ ⊥ˇαˇ ◦ c. We compute the value d of the latter using Lemma A.1, and win E◦◦(z,s) → unionsquH◦i (u, y,s) by
choosing d for u.
A.3. Proof of clause (b) of Lemma 14.6
Assume the conditions of clause (b) of Lemma 14.6. In CLA4, we can solve (25) as follows. Assume E◦(z,s), which, of
course, implies C(z). We compute the value of the binary predecessor of 2χ(|z|) , and use that value to specify r in the
resource of Lemma A.7. As a result, we get the resource A′(z,χ(|z|)) unionsqunionsqxB(z, x). This means that we will either know that
A′(z,χ(|z|)) is true, or ﬁnd a constant a for which we will know that B(z,a) is true.
If A′(z,χ(|z|)) is true, then so is E◦◦(z,s) and, by choosing the latter, we win (25).
Now, for the rest of this proof, suppose B(z,a) is true. Using clause 3 of Lemma A.3, we ﬁnd the number i with I(a, i).
Then we ﬁnd (the code of) the move α that X made in a. Namely, αˆ = [a]K×iK . Using Lemma A.6, we also ﬁnd the
deterministic successor b of a. Fix these α and b.
Let β1, . . . , βm be all legal moves in position E(s) that signify a choice of one of the two unionsq-disjuncts in some surface
subformula F0 unionsq F1 of E(s). Let H1(y,s), . . . , Hm(y,s) be the corresponding (⊥, y)-developments of E(s).
Further, let βm+1, . . . , βn be all strings such that, any move signifying a choice of a constant c for x in some surface
subformula xF (x) of E(s) looks like βic for some i ∈ {m + 1, . . . ,n}. Let Hm+1(y,s), . . . , Hn(y,s) be the corresponding
(⊥, y)-developments of E(s).
To solve (25), we need to solve its consequent, which now can be rewritten as follows:
E◦◦(z,s) unionsqL unionsqunionsquunionsqyH◦1(u, y,s) unionsq · · · unionsq unionsquunionsqyH◦m(u, y,s) unionsq
unionsquunionsqyH◦m+1(u, y,s) unionsq · · · unionsq unionsquunionsqyH◦n(u, y,s). (35)
This is how we solve (35). First, for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, we compare αˆ with βˆi. If they turn out to be the same,
then we choose the disjunct unionsquunionsqyH◦i (u, y,s) in (35), and specify u and y as b and 0 in it, respectively. Here our choice
of 0 for y is arbitrary and has no effect on the game, as H◦i (u, y,s) does not contain the variable y, anyway.
Otherwise, for each i ∈ {m + 1, . . . ,n}, we compare [αˆ]ri0 with βˆi, where ri is the size of βˆi. If they turn out to
be the same, then, we ﬁgure out the (code of the) “rest” γ of the string α. That is, γ is the string such that α = βiγ .
Employing Lemma A.5, we either ﬁnd a number c with D(γˆ , c), or (unionsq) ﬁnd out that such a c does not exist (¬∃). In the
former case, we choose the disjunct unionsquunionsqyH◦i (u, y,s) in (35) and specify u and y as b and c in it, respectively. In the latter
case, α is an illegal move, so we choose L, which is true because X , having made an illegal move, loses.
Otherwise, α is simply an illegal move, so we (again) choose L.
It is left to the reader to convince himself or herself that our strategy succeeds.
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